| Title | : | The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 |
| Author | : | |
| Rating | : | |
| ISBN | : | - |
| Language | : | English |
| Format Type | : | Paperback |
| Number of Pages | : | 63 |
| Publication | : | First published August 1, 1979 |
In June 1979, the Combat Studies institute was formed within the US Army Command and General Staff College. Among its several missions, the institute is charged by the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, to undertake historical research into problems having a bearing upon the concerns of the modern Army and to disseminate research throughout the Army. Major Robert A. Doughty’s, US Army Tactical Doctrine, 7946-76, is the first of a series the Leavenworth Papers to be published under the auspices Review.
It is fitting that this inaugural study of the Combat Studies the fruits of this The Evolution of of studies called of the Military Institute should focus upon the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before.
Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army’s doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development. This study is the first step along the road.
It is fitting that this inaugural study of the Combat Studies the fruits of this The Evolution of of studies called of the Military Institute should focus upon the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before.
Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army’s doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development. This study is the first step along the road.
