Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation by Serhii Plokhy

Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation Reviews

• 
  Max

  In Putin’s visit to Kyiv in 2013, he publicly stated that Ukrainians and Russians were one people. “We understand today’s realities: We have the Ukrainian people and the Belarusian people and other peoples, and we are respectful of that whole legacy, but at the foundation there lie, unquestionably, our common spiritual values, which make us one people.” In 2014 to unite his “one people” Putin sent his army into Ukraine taking Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine. Plokhy, a Harvard professor of Ukrainian history, explores what constitutes a Russian people and a Russian nation. He goes into great detail, tracing the concept from the fifteenth century to the present. It’s a constantly shifting idea often depending on the political needs of those in power. But for empire building it is a necessary idea. There has to be an underlying ideology, a reason for the people to feel united in their support of their leader. The claim of a common identity can be based on a shared language, a shared history, a shared culture, a shared religion, a shared ethnicity, or a shared community. The book, published in 2017, does not take in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, although it is pertinent and predictive. Unfortunately, I found much of it to be a slow read, particularly for the period prior to the twentieth century, as I was unfamiliar with the many architects of cultural identity in Russia, Ukraine and nearby counties. My notes follow.
  
  Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan III began building his claims of dynastic heritage by marrying the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor in 1472. Not satisfied with just a Roman heritage, Ivan also claimed descent from the Scandinavian Rurikid dynasty that had ruled the Kyivan Rus’ people until the thirteenth century. Ivan leveraged this “heritage” claiming a common Rus’ identity and using it to legitimize his rule over the neighboring territories he conquered. Ivan declared himself “Tsar” and ruler of “all Rus’.” Ivan began what would become the Russian empire or nation. The distinction is problematic. Plokhy notes “The traditional view holds that Russia’s problem with self-identification derives from the fact it acquired an empire before it acquired a nation.” Britain, for example, could easily distinguish itself from its colonies, but this distinction in Russia is not at all clear, and viewed quite differently by the different peoples that are or have been part of the Russian empire. Plokhy notes “It was the Kyivan myth of origins that became the cornerstone of Muscovy’s ideology as the polity evolved from a Mongol dependency to a sovereign state and then an empire.”
  
  1492 was the year 7,000 on the Orthodox calendar, the year Orthodox believers held the world was to end. Muscovites, looking forward to being with God, were disappointed. Regrouping, Moscow Metropolitan Zosima proclaimed that God had made Ivan III “a new Tsar Constantine for the new city of Constantine, sovereign of Moscow and the whole Rus’ land and many other lands.” The idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome” gained currency in Moscow, particularly after the Metropolitan of Moscow became the first Patriarch of Moscow in 1589. The other Orthodox Patriarchs approved realizing their dependency on continued financial support from the tsar. This perception of Moscow as the Third Rome “was elastic enough to accommodate major changes in Muscovites’ thinking about themselves and the world during the first half of the seventeenth century. At its core was the notion of the tsar’s status as the only remaining Orthodox emperor after the fall of Byzantium.” “Moscow as the Third Rome was switching from a defensive to an offensive strategy, of which there would be a great deal more in the decades and centuries to come.” In 1721 Peter I, after defeating Sweden in the Great Northern War, was declared “All-Russian Emperor” and “Father of the Fatherland.” The Fatherland connoted the idea of a Russian nation and a Russian people who inherited its patrimony along with the tsar. In the mid-eighteenth-century Moscow elites began promulgating an “All-Russian” historical narrative and creating an “All-Russian” language.
  
  Catherine II ruled Russia for 35 years beginning in 1762. She continued expanding the imperial Russia Peter I began. Through a series of wars, Russia, Prussia and Austria divided Poland up between them. Russia now encompassed most of what is today Ukraine and Belorussia. Catherine expected all those conquered to conform to Russian norms, convert to the Russian Orthodox church, and be part of the Russian nation. Easier said than done. Many were Uniates, a Catholic church with Orthodox traditions. Poles were Roman Catholic, viewed as an enemy by the Russian elite. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia brought a resurgence of Polish nationalism. It manifested in the Polish revolt in 1830, bringing into question the identity of a Russian in the new multi-ethnic empire. Moscow elites under Nicholas I saw rewriting history and reeducation as the key. An official history was adopted to show that the Western provinces had originally been Russian, but taken from them, and now all Russians were reunited. The Muscovite point of view was expounded at a new university set up in Kyiv with Russian as the official language. The Uniate Church was integrated into the Russian Orthodox in 1839. But the Russian efforts created a backlash of Kyivan intellectuals and leaders who envisioned an independent Ukrainian nation, not under the domination of Russia or Poland. The idea of Poland as an independent nation raised the idea of Ukraine as an independent nation which by the 1860s was being discussed by intellectuals in Kyiv and Moscow. Moscow reacted with measures to stop the Ukrainophile movement, with a priority to severely restrict the use of the Ukrainian language. Publications and even songs in theater had to be in Russian not Ukrainian. Attempts to latinize the Ukrainian alphabet were regarded by Moscow as polonization and forbidden. By the 1880s an independent Ukraine was an idea that wouldn’t go away.
  
  Much changed in Russia in 1905, the Bloody Sunday massacre, the formation of the Duma, the Russo-Japanese war, and a Polish uprising. The uprising was crushed but it made all involved consider where borders would be drawn if an independent Poland was formed. This led people to want to define Ukrainian borders. Also, in 1905 came the end of the formal restrictions on Local or “dialect” language publications. Not only Ukrainian but Belorussian newspapers and books proliferated. Ukrainian was still not allowed in classrooms. Many Ukrainophiles just wanted cultural autonomy rather than full-fledged independence. Strident Russian nationalists also pushed their agenda of land reform targeting Polish landowners and Jewish middlemen who bought the crops from the peasants. With the outbreak of WWI and early Russian victories in Galicia against the Austrians, Russian nationalism was at its peak. Nationalists targeted what they called a German-Polish-Jewish alliance in Ukraine and sent activists packing or underground. But the quick turn of the war and the tsar’s loss of power led activists to demand cultural autonomy.
  
  With the first (March) 1917 Russian revolution Ukrainian activists formed a Central Council or Central Rada which in June declared Ukraine’s territorial autonomy. The Bolsheviks claimed to support the Rada and autonomy. But after taking power in the October revolution the Bolsheviks cracked down on the Rada not accepting any thinking independent of the Party line. In 1918 still under German occupation, a Belarusian Rada proclaimed Belarus independent of Russia. The German’s helped activists start a newspaper in the Belarusian language, a first. Ukraine’s Rada next step to promote its language was to get the Ukrainian language taught in its schools, while for the Belarusian Rada just getting a newspaper and some publications in Belarusian was a major step forward.
  
  On December 30, 1922 the Soviet Union was created. The old empire now consisted of four “independent” republics: the Russian federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Despite the independent designation, the Party dominated by Russia was firmly in control. Still, leaving Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus out of the Russian Federation fostered an independent identity in the people. Stalin wanted political support from the independent republics and promoted a policy called indigenization. This encouraged recruiting local peoples to Party positions along with their language and culture. Stalin wanted support from the republics to offset his Politburo rivals. In 1927 after Trotsky and others were driven from the Party cementing Stalin’s control, indigenization was dropped. Another reason, at that time, Stalin feared renewed war with the West and wanted ethnic Russians in control of the Republics, not trusting their loyalty. He would continue to crack down on cultural autonomy through the 1930s. Concerned with the threat of war from Germany and Japan, in the 1930s Stalin doubled down on the patriotism of ethnic Russians. Even historical figures such as the tsars were treated with respect and pride in official publications. Conversely, people of different ethnicities, particularly German and Polish, but also Ukrainian and Belarusian, were automatically deemed suspicious, potential turncoats should there be war. Non-Russians were quickly singled out in the purges of the late thirties. The idea of one Russian people across the empire was forgotten.
  
  As WWII approached, Stalin reversed his approach to Ukraine and encouraged recognition of Ukrainian heroes and culture. Then with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin quickly dropped the policy of emphasizing a separate Ukrainian culture. It was one Russian people again. Then Stalin would embrace Ukrainian identity again in 1943 when Red Army brigades were designated Ukrainian to lead the offensive west. Whether Ukrainians were treated as a separate or significant nationality depended on the perceptions of Stalin as to how much he needed their support. Khrushchev took over in 1953 and continued Stalin’s dance. Intimately familiar with Ukraine, at first, he promoted ethnic Ukrainians and encouraged the Ukrainian language and arts. By 1957 firmly in power, just like Stalin he switched to Russification, prohibiting teaching Ukrainian in public schools. By the 1980’s the effects of Russification were giving results with 20% of Belarusian’s and slightly less in Ukraine saying they were Russian. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Soviet republics declared independence. Interestingly, Russian president Yeltsin, used the term Russian Federation in his speeches rather than the Russian nation, de-emphasizing ethnicity as the tie that binds.
  
  Putin succeeded Yeltsin on New Year’s Eve 1999. Trying to reestablish Russian control over the former republics of the Soviet Union, he was dismayed by the 2004 Ukrainian election defeating his pick for president with a pro-Western leader. A similar situation took place in Georgia which Putin invaded in 2008. Ukraine wanted NATO membership, but NATO kept putting it off. Putin looked at Russian nationalist writers from the past and adopted a new theme to highlight Russian culture and enhance Russian influence. He set up a foundation, Russian World, which had a stated goal of promoting Russian language and culture abroad. The focus was the “near abroad”, countries like Ukraine, Latvia, Moldova, Kazakhstan. Ukraine responded with plans to sign an association agreement with the EU which would dash Putin’s plan for a greater Russian World, the rebirth of the Russian empire. Ukraine was essential to that vision. The parallels to Hitler’s partition of Czechoslovakia and the Austrian Anschluss were obvious, using the trope of ethnic Russians deprived of their identity in Ukraine to take over the territory. Putin, for this purpose, considered all Russian speakers to be Russian, regardless of ethnicity, heritage or loyalty. However, as we have seen, just because a Ukrainian speaks Russian does not mean they want to be part of Putin’s empire.
  
• 
  Hadrian

  The Lost Kingdom, as it turns out, is the medieval Kyivan/Kievan Rus. By Plokhy's own description, the aim of this book is to ask several age-old questions: What is Russia, what is Russian nationalism, and what is Russian imperialism?
  
  The first six or so chapters follow a standard narrative - the "gathering of the lands of Rus'" in the 9th-11th centuries, then the conquests of Novgorod, Kazan, and Astrakhan, the Empire of Russia's acquisition of western territories through the partitions of Poland, and the Soviet Union's commitment to "internationalism" - I'm of course skipping a lot. This book isn't aiming to replace traditional summaries of Russian history, but instead approaches it from a history of the western frontier.
  
  The question is that that the borders of successive Russian states - everything after the fall of the Mongol yoke, really - did not align with the people that, broadly defined, were considered at one time another to be 'part' of a Russian nationality. According to Plokhy, modern Russian identity took its more recognizable form in the 19th century, partly in rivalry to and in competition with the other nationalist project of Poland. Successive revolts led some Russian elites and intellectuals to state that there was a 'single Russian people', albeit with regional variants.
  
  Chapters on the Soviet Union describe an ambivalent relationship on ethnic nationalism; on the one hand, official policies tended towards promotion of languages, cultures, and administrative figures as part of a policy of "indigenization" in the early years; but this was again subordinate to "Russification" by the Stalinist period, and each Soviet republic was still subordinate to the center in terms of economic policy and resource outputs.
  
  Much of the book is analytical, although the last chapters are more explicitly opinionated on current events: Plokhy outlines the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass conflict starting in 2014, and he cautions about finding an alternate role for Russian nationhood, a "modern civic nation", and one that doesn't see itself exclusively as an imperial power. Well, they wouldn't be alone - the British are still dealing with that.
  
  "The imperial construct of a big Russian nation is gone, and no restoration project can bring it back to life." That made my eyebrows shoot up. And Plokhy quotes Putin himself in the final chapters, talking about sharing the baptismal font of the Dniepr River. Certainly as there are elites who dream of a greater Russia- no doubt there are some Russian speakers that are a convenient reason to send the troops in.
• 
  Corina Romonti

  I finished this fantastic book this morning and it was mind-blowinngly good. I couldn’t put it down - I guess most part of Russian and Soviet history reads like a political thriller.
  •
  It deals with the Russian question of national identity. It’s quite hard to pinpoint the start of the Russian nation/ empire but this book explains the whens and hows very well. I got lost in some of the details and I think you have to have a prior knowledge of some historical events to properly engage with it but it’s really worth it for the “plot”. Most of the book deals with the complex historical relation between Ukraine and Russia culminating with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
  •
  I learned so much and my fascination with Russian and Eastern European history has actually deepened after reading this book. To no one’s surprise Russia has always been a political and economic bully towards Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries and even Poland (which they tried to annex in its entirety many times).
  •
  Most of the book deals with the end of imperialism and the raise of communism in Russia and its territories. It’s absolutely crazy to read how their intentions towards the countries in the union fluctuated between - “you’re allowed to have a national and cultural identity” to “you must all learn Russian otherwise...” from from decade to decade. Lenin believed in cultural nationalism whereas Stalin killed everyone who even dared to think of Ukraine and Belarus as other nations. Krushchev relaxed this rule and allowed people to speak their language only for Brezhnev to come 10 years later and impose Russian again. It’s a continuous political and cultural see-saw that these countries had to live with for most of their existence. It’s honestly a fascinating book that taught me so much. For example I never knew that Soviet means council in Russian - that’s how Lenin’s communist party started - as a city council.
  I’ll read a lot more by Serhii Plokhy for sure. I read Chernobyl: The History of a Tragedy last year and that was amazing too. He’s a very important historian and a wonderful writer.
• 
  Wick Welker

  Excellent overview of the history of Russia.
  
  I came into this book with very little knowledge about Russian history. I was looking for something that gave me a good overview without too much excruciating detail and this book definitely met that goal.
  
  We get a nice intro into the early Muscovites and Ivan III, who managed to gain sovereign independence from the Mongul horde at the time. Ivan III tripled the land mass of the people and made himself the first Tsar. By marrying the Byzantine niece of Constantine, he made a claim that Muscovy would be the Third Rome. The author covers the rise of Catherine the Great and how she basically usurped the empire from Peter and ushered a kind of elite renaissance while maintaining absolute monarchy rule. We get a little history about Napoleon briefly taking Moscow and then losing soon thereafter.
  
  Throughout much of the book is the long and agonizing story of the Russian empire trying to govern a whole bunch of people that didn’t want to be part of the empire. From the Baltics to Poland, Belarus and then, oh my gosh, Ukraine, Russia is one big long history of trying to assert linguistic, cultural and military control and censorship over these states. Russia has forever been a nation trying to understand who it is and who exactly is a part of this nation. From the Polish revolts and the November Uprising of 1830 and Bloody Sunday, it’s just such a mess. Poland and Ukraine have forever been constant areas of conflict between Russia and also Germany. WWI was basically an imperial arms-race land grab that turned into a war.
  
  With the labor and sovereign revolts bubbling up everywhere, it’s no surprise that Nicholas II of the Ramanov line tried to move to a constitutional monarchy. But this wasn’t enough and he finally had to abdicate the throne. He was exiled and eventually executed with his family. The monarchy was dead and Marxist influences finally started to come to a head with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Bolsheviks coming into power, led by Vladimir Lenin. There was quite a bit of conflict between Lenin and Stalin about how to run their fledgling socialist movement. Stalin won because Lenin died of like three strokes. Regardless of proposed communist ideology, Stalin just ran an authoritarian, one party regime with a “Republic” of soviet states that had no power aside from the Soviet party. What followed was mass economic stagnation, 4 million dead from famine and the institution of the Gulag concentration camps where forced labor and abject genocide occured for dissentors. Stalin presided over murder, genocide and ethnic cleansing. With the German-Russian non-aggression Molotov Pact, the two powers decided they had the right to go ahead and partition off parts of Poland. But then Germany broke the pact and invaded Russia, kind of starting WWII.
  
  Fast forward to Krushchev and his obsession with a communist global order and you get the perfect ingredients for a Cold War with the two world powers and many, many proxy wars across the globe that slaughtered millions of people. It seemed like there was a second there where the Soviets had some things figured out like launching satellites in space and actually competing in the world economy but it didn’t last very long. By the time Gorbechav took over as the eight and final leader of the USSR, the economy was in total free fall. Gorbie tried to implement the perestroika, an economic reform, bringing in more liberal market reforms and maybe more economic independence of the soviet republics. Perestroika may have helped liberalize some of the political elite and something worked because elections actually started to be a thing with Boris Yeltsin becoming the first “elected” President. By the early 90s, after a failed coup attempt by conservative Soviet military leaders, the writing was on the wall as Ukraine declared independence with the rest of the states doing the same within that same week, bringing the end of the USSR. Enter Putin, the second “president” who presides over a rigid privatized economy at the behest of Russian Oligarchs in what is just a rebranded dictatorship.
  
  The fact that Putin annexed Crimea and is currently in a war to just steal the country makes soooo much sense. The ecstasy and agony of Moscow and Kyiv over the entire course of Russian history is what defines Russian nationalism. Russia believes itself to be a lost empire and Putin probably sees himself as the steward of that lost empire and salivating about retaking Kyiv to bring about a new Euroasia world order state as has been done with the EU. Meanwhile, the fallout of death, murder and war crimes continues.
  
  This was an excellent and pretty objective book. Recommend.
• 
  Anthony Taylor

  In Search of Identity.
  
  The question you’re probably asking is ‘which kingdom is the Lost Kingdom?’ The answer is the Kievan Rus. Lost Kingdom by Serhii Plokhy centres around inheritance of this medieval state. From the release of the grip of the Mongols to present day Russia has struggled to build a nation and identity, competing with the Poles, Belorussians (so called White Russians) and Ukrainians (the Little Russians) in the east of Europe. All peoples who’s territory has an association with the Kievan Rus. The age old questions which Polkhy asks are ‘what is Russian Imperialism?’ And ‘what is Russian Nationalism?’ In this book we are in search of Russian in the east of Europe.
  
  The book takes us on a journey from the 1450s to the 2014 invasion of Crimea to show how the focus of Russian nationalism changed through the each period to suit the objectives in of the state. The modern view of Russian Nationalism or Imperialism took its recognisable form in the 19th century following the final partition of Poland. As the Revolution rolled away the old, Soviet aims were to develop a new national identity of communism in a group of states collected together into the USSR. Nationalism was stirred up in the Great Patriotic War (WWII) to defeat the Germans and then it reverted to suppression of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Yiddish languages and identities in the reign of Nikita Khrushchev.
  
  As Polkhy argues there is still a drive today to unite ethnically Russian peoples which has reached a climax with the invasion of Ukraine (the second, in 2022 would be unknown at the time of writing, but I imagine predicted) as Russia cannot separate from The Boarderlands. He states this will have a profound impact on world politics much like the Third Reichs desire to unite the German speaking peoples in the 1930s. As we know this true, but what we don’t know is: where will this end?
  
  As with most historical sweeps, the earlier periods run through quicker than the modern areas. I have no issue with this personally as there are simple more sources as time marches on. Polkhy’s opinions are more prevalent as he talks about the rise of Putin and his national aims and the book ends in a political commentary of modern Russia. Again I have no issue with this. However, the book is easy to read, I did find it boring in places and at one stage thought about quitting. However, in soldering on I got to the end. Without feeling like much is learnt. Russia sees itself as the inheritor of Byzantium (Moscow is the third and final Rome) and then in later years the inheritor of the Kievan Rus who has a duty to unite all Russian speaking peoples into its empire. In whatever guise this forms. Something which, for example, the British abandoned long ago. Where does it stop?
• 
  Zane

  I really enjoyed reading Plohky's Lost Kingdom. As a history buff with very limited knowledge of Russian imperial history, this book was both insightful and a pleasure to read. Capturing five centuries in such a short book obviously means cutting corners here and there, but the red thread of both Russian imperialism (orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality) and the 'all-Russian nation' (Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian) sets the stage for an engaging and insightful understanding of Russia's historical development. The second half of the book covers the USSR's shifting approach to its 'independent' republics and, after its demise, the book briefly covers Russia's orientation to its near-abroad. For people looking for a place to start on Russian history, Plohky does a nice job.
• 
  Karen

  Very interesting book (I listened to the audiobook). Of all the books I’ve recently read about Ukraine or Russia, I found this title and Timothy Snyder’s The Road to Unfreedom the most illuminating in terms of Putin’s world view and actions in Feb/March 2022.
  
  This Politico interview with Fiona Hill inspired me to read about the history of Kyiv in the Russian empire. Note that I don’t support the Russian war — I stand with Ukraine.
  
  “ ‘Yes, He Would’: Fiona Hill on Putin and Nukes”
  
  https://www.politico.com/news/magazin...
• 
  saïd

  An incredibly depressing book to read, but worthwhile for anyone interested in learning more about the history of Russian colonialism in and exploitation of Ukraine. (The eponymous "lost kingdom" is Kyivan Rus'.) I wonder how Russian nationalists would feel if informed that a good percentage of "their" country should actually be, by this same logic, Mongolian.
• 
  Scriptor Ignotus

  Lost Kingdom is a history of the ambiguous, and ultimately irresolvable, interplay between Russian nationalism and Russian imperialism. Like many modern states, including the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and France, Russia acquired an empire before it acquired a nation. But as the British historian Geoffrey Hosking has pointed out, whereas Britain had an empire, Russia was an empire, and has never fully been able to conceive of itself as anything else. Furthermore, to the extent that Russians have attempted to identify themselves in “national” terms—whether tied to ethnicity, religion, language, dynastic inheritance, or any combination thereof—the frontiers of these imagined realms have rarely cohered with Russia’s political borders. Even more uniquely, Russia has, for almost all of its history, shared its mythology of national origins in the civilization of Kyivan Rus’ with neighbors that remained stubbornly outside of its political control.
  
  From the 1470s, when Ivan III of the Grand Duchy of Moscow threw off the “Tartar yoke”, crushed the Republic of Novgorod, and began styling himself “Grand Prince of All Rus’”; to its interminable conflicts with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries over the “liberation” of the Orthodox Christians (most of whom were Uniates, or Eastern Catholics) of its Ruthenian (modern-day Ukraine and Belarus) lands; to its invention of a tripartite Russian nationality comprised of the “Great Rus’” (Russia), “White Rus’” (Belarus), and “Little Rus’” (Ukraine) tribal denominations in the nineteenth century; to its dramatic oscillations in the Soviet Era between Lenin’s policy of national “indigenization” and Stalin’s brutal regime of “Russification”; to Vladimir Putin’s disastrous war on Ukraine and the ideological self-deception behind it; Russia has always been an empire in search of a nation.
  
  Yet if it fails to subdue Ukraine, as we must hope it does, it may have proven itself, finally and definitively, unable to be either. What happens then is anyone’s guess.
• 
  Dennis

  Serhii Plokhy's 'Lost Kingdom' has a solid prose that easily flows. The narrative hardly loses pace, and you easily hop from Kyiv to Moscow, from tsarist to nationalist to soviet intellectuals on a clear chronological path. Do read it if you want to understand the evolution of an idea and how it is applied to high politics. Analytically however the book has some problems. I found three of 'm.
  
  1. Without strictly defining 'national', 'ethnic' or 'cultural', Plokhy can be a bit too vague at times. Perhaps that is the curse of trying to write a readable book for a wider audience.
  
  2. Also, while intellectual and high political debate on the Russian nation (and the Ukrainian, and the Polish, and the Belarusian) is given a lot of attention, we're left to guess a bit at how these ideas found their way to the masses. Was it through the advent of print media? Along trade routes and knowledge networks as a byproduct of capitalism? Was it through industrialisation, where the labouring class formed and imagined an identity beyond their villages and towns? Was it through conscription? Or as an evolution of monarchist or religious identity? Was it through democratization and some sense of equality shared by all? But perhaps that is one of the problems of Russian nationalism. Nationalism developed in Western countries along such lines. In Russia however it was botched, in part by autocratic tendencies to very violently enforce the sense of nation.
  
  3. And finally, how has Russian sense of nation been affected by early modern imperialist expansion to the east? Surely coming into contact with different cultures causes one to reassess the self. Perhaps this point stems from my own national identity as I'm from the Netherlands, a country that has identity issues as a result of overseas imperialism and its legacy.
  
  Anyways, the book does help to understand the cultural basis of the way the Kremlin thinks today, so I would recommend it.
• 
  Michael Samerdyke

  "Lost Kingdom" was interesting and frustrating.
  
  It is a very knowledgeable look at the relationship between the three East Slavic nationalities from the time of Ivan III (around 1480) to the present.
  
  However, as I read, I kept thinking that something was missing, or the story was not being told from the best perspective.
  
  Perhaps the book should have been organized along thematic lines, with chapters defining specific terms and how they have worked out over time, instead of a chronological progression.
  
  There is a lot of interesting information here. In particular, I found the account of Nicholas II's visit to the Ukrainian territory Russia captured from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early months of the First World War very interesting. Also, the discussion of how Putin's relationship with the "near abroad" changed over the course of the early 2000s was very clear and well presented.
  
  Worth a read if you have an interest in Russian or Ukrainian history, but this should NOT be the first book you read on the subject.
• 
  Aditya Raj

  The term 'Russian' is not some kind of abstract average of the three terms (great, little, and white) but a living cultural strength, a grand, developing, and growing national force.", wrote Petr Struve in 1912. A century later, just when Crimea was about to be annexed by Putin, he quoted Struve in one of his speech justifying the annexation of Crimean land claiming it to be a part of Russia. Since the days of Rurik dynasty in the 11th Century, the rulers of all Rus' have seen great, little and white Russia (namely Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) as one land. To preserve it, they have consistently employed various linguistic, ethnic, and cultural policies to keep at bay the voices of the separatists or those who demanded autonomy of the regions. Either during the Tsars imperial period (recognised in 1558) or Lenin's Rveloultion of 1917, the history of Rus' has often been accommodated to justify the nationalistic policies of the various rulers.
  
  Serhii Plokhy's Lost Kingdom is a history of the same period starting from the days of Ivan the Great when, gradually, Tsar was recognised by the West and an Orthodox Patriarchate was established in the Muscovy land. Russian nationalism had been kept intact as one until the dissolution of USSR in 1991; nevertheless, it was through the great efforts and ever-shifting narratives of all Rus' history that they maintained to do so. This book, though laden with too many details in just 350 pages, helps you understand how one Russian identity had been preserved throughout these vast lands until its dissolution on the civic and political basis instead of linguistic and cultural justifications.
• 
  David

  Russian history viewed through the prism of Nationalism. Slight Leftist bent but still quite good.
  
  Rating: 4 out of 5 Stars
• 
  Ilze Paegle-Mkrtčjana

  Neapšaubāmi vērtīga un noderīga grāmata visiem, kas interesējas ne vien par krievu impēriskās domāšanas veidošanos un tās saikni ar priekšstatu par nacionālo identitāti, bet arī par tā vai cita perioda krievu, ukraiņu un baltkrievu intelektuāļu diskusijām par identitāti, nāciju, nacionālo pašapziņu un valstiskumu. Tomēr - kā jau vienmēr - ir dažas problēmas. minēšu tikai divas. kas man šķita īpaši būtiskas. Pirmkārt, varbūt ir loģiski uzsākt šo apcerējumu ar vēstījumu par Maskavas kņazistes (Maskavijas) veidošanos, ja jau uzmanības centrā ir tieši Krievija un krievu nācijas veidošanās, taču vismaz neliels atskats Kijevas Krievzemes vēsturē būtu ļoti noderējis, lai labāk izprastu, kas tieši vēlāk kļuva par vienu no krievu nacionālā mīta svarīgākajām sastāvdaļām. Otrkārt un galvenokārt: nav īsti saprotams, kāpēc, runājot par Krievijas impērijas veidošanos un tātad daudziem un dažādiem kariem un teritoriju aneksiju, autors gandrīz vispār nepiemin t. s. krievu-turku karus, tik daudzskaitlīgus un brutālus, kuriem bija īpaša nozīme impērijas dienvidaustrumu robežu paplašināšanā un nostiprināšanā. It sevišķi interesanta šī problēma kļūst, ņemot vērā to nenoliedzamo apstākli, ka lielākā daļa no šīm savulaik iekarotajām un anektētajām teritorijām ietilpst mūsdienu Ukrainas sastāvā un to pievienošana impērijai joprojām ir kā imperiālā, tā arī antikoloniālā naratīva sastāvdaļa - pietiek atcerēties kaut vai Potjomkina mirstīgo atlieku ekshumāciju pirms krievu okupācijas armijas atkāpšanās no Hersonas vai Katrīnas Lielās pieminekļa demontāžu Odesā.
• 
  Alex

  One of the best histories--of any topic--I have encountered. Despite the considerable span of time covered in his text, Plokhy never strays from the question of how Russian nationalism has emerged, morphed and disappeared countless times over the centuries and writes with admirable clarity.
• 
  Mylove4book

  很多人相信，最根本來說，第二次世界大戰源於未能以和平方法解決「德意志問題」，也有些人把希特勒和普丁打民族牌來動搖和兼併鄰國領土的做法相提並論。在東西方關係上，俄-烏衝突業已成了冷戰結束後最嚴重的國際危機。到底兼併克里米亞和頓巴斯戰爭是蘇聯解體的最後一幕，還是標誌著歐洲進入了一個恐怖的新階段，一個人口和土地被重塑的階段，仍有待觀察。

  
  
  克里米亞已在2014年被俄羅斯兼併，而頓巴斯戰爭則在2015年明斯克協議後趨緩，而本書則是在2017年時出版。當時烏東尚不穩定，但對於衝突的發展則是未知的，不過很遺憾的在2022年2/24俄軍全面入侵烏克蘭後，很顯然的是往對歐洲不利的方向發展了……也不只是歐洲如此，全世界都陷入了對能源和軍備的雙重恐慌吧。
  
  本書幾乎是完全著重於民族、語言、血統、宗教等的角度，來解釋斯拉夫人綿延幾百年的歷史糾結。論述思想的部分居多，歷史場景重現的部分較少，老實說讀起來有點累。而且個人對斯拉夫和蘇聯都沒有甚麼基礎的知識，有時候會比較難跟上腳步。不過到後來1990年前後的部分就比較熟悉了，尤其是到了普丁的年代，搭配上時事來看簡直是細思極恐，尤其是下面這段:
  
  

  普丁有一次這樣問出生烏克蘭的<共青團真理報>記者卡夫坦:「你讀過鄧尼金的日記嗎？」這裡的日記是指內戰期間白軍將領鄧尼金的回憶錄。「沒有。」卡夫坦回答說，但答應回家之後會去讀。「記得要讀。」普丁叮囑他，然後補充說: 「鄧尼金討論了大俄羅斯和小俄羅斯。小俄羅斯就是烏克蘭。他指出，沒有人被容許在我們的關係之間攪和，那總是俄羅斯的家務事。」

  
  
  普丁對於烏克蘭有如恐怖情人一般的執著，最大一部分是防禦的迫切需求，另一部分也許真的是源於蘇聯歷史的緬懷吧。不過個人感覺所有檯面上的理由，在檯面下應該還是有現實面(錢啦)上的考量，但因為本書並沒有著重這個部分，烏克蘭也不是經濟大國，也許入侵的真正原因要好幾年以後才會被研究出來了。
  
• 
  Georgiana

  Reading this during Russia's latest invasion of Ukraine has been like watching a car crash in slow motion. The book itself is terrific, but got increasingly difficult on an emotional level, as well as.increasingly complicated. I will definitely be reading it again soon.
• 
  Олег Проданчук

  Наскільки цікава та цінна ця книга, настільки ж низький рівень даного видання, жахлива якість друку, газетний папір. 
  
  Дуже мало авторів історичної літератури вміють так доступно, фахово та водночас легко подавати інформацію до читачів, захоплювати переплетеннями дат та подій, не втомлюючи зайвими даними. Вкотре з цим завданням блискуче впорався Сергій Плохій.
  
  "Загублене царство" допомогає читачеві зрозуміти ворога, Росію, та його хворобливу схибленість на українському питанні, передумови її винекнення, перші прояви та наслідки. Книга доводить читачеві існування неперервної війни ідентичності, яка привела й до сумнозвісних подій сьогодення і почалась ще задовго до передачі Криму до складу УРСР та розвалу тюрми народів.
  
  Крім того, книга пропонує якісну базу фактів та аргументів щодо неспростовного зазіхання "сусідів" на нашу історію та безпідставне присвоєння цілих історичних періодів.
  
  Росіяни давно мусять серйозно взятися за вивчення власної історії, відкинувши пропаганду, перестати марити небилицями, типу "Москва - третій Рим", дати спокій цивілізованому світу та зайнятися, нарешті, собою, замість витрачання мільйонів на зародження та підтримку війн на чужих землях або просто зникнути, від чого абсолютна більшість світу тільки виграє.
  
  Книгу рекомендую, але раджу чекати від видавництва перевидання у хорошій якості, на яке книга безумовно заслуговує.
• 
  Dan Sumption

  this book traces the history of the ethnic Rus' and Russian people, the Russian nation from Kyiv and Muscovy onwards, the Russian Empire, the USSR, and all that followed in the break-up of the Soviet Union. But primarily it is about the Rus' people: whether Greater Russian, Ukrainian (Little Russian) or Belarusian (White Russian).
  
  Despite being over long and and often repetitive, the book misses out a lot of detail that I would have hoped to learn more about. The vast part of Russia that exists to the east of the river Volga is only mentioned once before we reached the 1920s, and that in reference to Tsar selling Alaska to the Americans. How the Tsar obtained Alaska–or indeed Siberia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan…–is never explained. Even in the Ukraine (the Little Russian nation whose relationship to Greater Russia is the undercurrent running through the entire book), the Crimean War merits less than one of the book's 350 pages.
• 
  Alina Butenko

  У цій книжці викладено все, що потрібно знати про "рускій мір", вже кілька століть так сильно нав'язуваний українцям агресивним сусідом. Як і всі дослідження пана Плохія — докладно, цікаво, обґрунтовано, потужно, зрозуміло, логічно. Книжка дійсно читається, як захопливий історичний роман, в якому всі події та дійові особи існували насправді. Прекрасна альтернатива сухим підручникам історії.
• 
  Zack McCullough

  In the acknowledgement, Serhii Plokhy, the author, mentions that he originally envisioned this as an academic work, but when the events of 2014 in Crimea occurred, he decided to write it for a general audience to read. I would hate to see the academic version of this! There were some interesting parts for sure and it did help my understanding of Russian history, but overall the work was unnecessarily dry and difficult to read, especially the first 2/3 or so. While I really struggled to get through the first half or 2/3 of the book, and even the more interesting latter parts took some work, some valuable information was gleaned. So if you are willing to put in some time and effort to learn about this stuff, go for it.
  
  The book could also be titled ...A history of Russian Imperialism... as most Russian leaders have emphasized expansion (often disguised as nationalism) and specifically control of the areas of modern-day Ukraine and Belarus. The attempted control of these areas is the focus of the book.
  
  This attempted control has been understood differently depending on the time period. For much of the Medieval and Early Modern eras, Ukraine was seen as "Little Russia," and Belarus as "White Russia." Some people saw them as separate entities, tied to "Great Russia" at the core. Others have seen them as the same people, connected by one of several things: Slavic ethnicity, similar culture and traditions, or Orthodox religion. This whole tripartite conception was new to me, and I appreciated learning about it, however, sometimes the big picture was drowned in this book by the deluge of names, organizations, and other minutia. Some of this could have been eliminated for non-specialists reading this work. What is perhaps most interesting is the continual vacillation throughout the scope of the book between emphasizing the language and cultures of these areas and trying to stamp them out or subvert them beneath Russian culture and language. But both efforts, ironically enough, were usually seen by Russian authorities as conducive to controlling them.
  
  This can best be exemplified in the what I would consider one of the most interesting parts of the book, the Soviet Era. When the Bolsheviks first came to power, Vladimir Lenin envisioned an international movement of the Proletariat. In his conception, national differences should be minimized and ideally disappear and instead class differences emphasized. However, within the Marxist historical model, there was also the idea that a people must achieve nationhood before experiencing a socialist revolution that would unite them with the international movement. So in order to do this, the unique cultures of Belarus and Ukraine were to be emphasized (but only for a short time) as separate, but equal members of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But then... Joseph Stalin came to power after Lenin's death and perhaps even more importantly, Adolph Hitler rose to power in Germany. In order to create a modern nation that could resist Hitler's advance, and later compete with Western powers, Stalin emphasized the Russian nation as THE Soviet nation, and all the non-Russian people in the Soviet Union as inferior members in the Union. In the case of World War II, the non-Russians (Ukraine and Belarus, among others) were allowed to develop patriotism for their nation, but only so that they would more effectively fight against the German/Austrian invaders. As soon as the war was over, these national identities were immediately subverted and opposition to the Soviet (insert Russian) nationality was seen as opposition to the Communist Party and the Revolution. With each successive leader of the USSR, there was a back-and-forth concerning the way that non-Russian groups, primarily Ukraine and Belarus, were to be viewed. This is not really a complaint against the book, but I did notice that Ukraine and Belarus were emphasized by Plokhy. But what about the other "non-Russian" peoples?
  
  The other interesting part in the book was the recent rise to power of Vladimir Putin, who made it clear that he believes the Ukrainians and Russians are one people. Plokhy makes it clear that he and others in Russian leadership, have been willing to go to drastic measures to ensure that Ukraine is under the influence, if not outright control, of Moscow. Interestingly, Putin has used the Orthodox Christian religion to justify his attempt at expansion, which was common in pre-Soviet times. However, in other ways he has demonstrated a nostalgia for the Soviet Union, which was an officially atheist government.
  
  Though the justifications have changed drastically and frequently over the centuries, the majority of Russian leaders, from the Tsars of old to the "Man of Steel" himself, have had a similar determination, which is the control of Belarus and most importantly, Ukraine. With the failure (so far) of the efforts of Putin to bring Ukraine under his control, it would seem that Russian leadership may have to give up on this dream. But we shall see...
• 
  Bjorn Roose

  Ik heb de laatste maanden wel vaker interessante, of op zijn minst lezenswaardige boeken, gekocht bij Standaard Boekhandel, en ook dit Het verloren Koninkrijk van Serhii Ploky valt onder die categorie.
  
  Niet dat het nog écht nodig was om mij ervan te overtuigen dat de recentste oorlog in Oekraïne niet zomaar uit de lucht was komen vallen, maar dit boek documenteert wel zéér mooi hoe die oorlog in de historische context past en hoe oud die oorlog in werkelijkheid is. Toen ik aan mijn (intussen voormalige, want ik heb mijn avondonderwijs in die taal "met vrucht" beëindigd) lerares Hongaars, tevens opgeleid in de Slavische talen, vertelde dat het boek - voornamelijk - ging over datgene wat Oekraïne en Rusland bindt, zei ze ook meteen: "Uiteraard, Kiev-Roes !"
  
  Maar het boek is méér dan dat: het gaat ook over de pogingen van een aspirerend rijk om afwisselend gebruik te maken van de verschillende elementen die een volk vormen: taal, geschiedenis, cultuur, religie. En uiteraard over de pogingen van de tegenstanders van die aspiraties, nationalisten bijvoorbeeld, om van diezelfde elementen gebruik te maken om hun volk te vormen en daarmee duidelijk te maken dat dat volk nooit over één kam kan geschoren worden met andere volkeren die het rijk binnen zijn grenzen probeert te incorporeren. Het gaat dus over identiteitsvorming en identiteitsmisvorming, over pogingen het ene element in de identeitsvorming te laten overheersen op het andere, over tegen de stroom ingaan en proberen de stroom te vormen.
  
  Je ziet in de verschillende hoofdstukken de tijden aan je voorbij trekken: "De uitvinding van Rusland", "De hereniging van de Roeslanden", "De trilaterale natie", "De revolutie van naties" en dan - maar nog niet ten slotte - "De onverbreekbare Unie", zijnde de Sovjet-Unie. Met zijn pogingen een nieuw element in de identiteitsvorming binnen te brengen en dat te laten heersen over alle andere: ideologie. Met zijn teruggrijpen naar taal, geschiedenis, cultuur, religie in tijden dat alleen dié nog "redding" konden brengen (de Tweede Wereldoorlog in het bijzonder). Met zijn enorme leugenachtigheid en retourner sa veste wanneer het het regime ook maar paste: nationalisme werd telkens weer opgestookt wanneer dat dienstig was en terug onder controle gebracht/in de kiem gesmoord als het niet meer (mis)bruikbaar was. Een strategie die in de Sovjet-Unie uiteraard nog méér slachtoffers onder nationalisten kostte dan elders, maar waar nationalisten altijd weer en ook vandaag de dag nog telkens weer intuinen (zie, bijvoorbeeld, de Koerden).
  
  En dan komen we uiteindelijk bij Gorbatsjov, Jeltsin en Poetin. Duidelijk minder "ver van huis" voor de in Rusland uit Oekraïense ouders geboren auteur, wat helaas zijn effect lijkt te hebben op zijn objectiviteit. Het laatste hoofdstuk, "Het nieuwe Rusland", heeft af en toe meer weg van een anti-Poetin pamflet, dan van geschiedschrijving. Het gaat té veel uit van "Dat is toch niet meer van deze tijd" en te weinig van wat de auteur in de vorige hoofdstukken heeft duidelijk gemaakt, zijnde dat de interesse van Rusland voor Oekraïne van álle tijden is. De auteur lijkt zich daarmee in te passen in het The end of history-discours van Francis Fukuyama en zijn aanhangers, die toch zó graag zouden zien dat er met het einde van de Koude Oorlog ook een einde gekomen is aan de voortgang van de menselijke geschiedenis, dat de schijnbare status quo van nu voor eeuwig gehandhaafd blijft. Volkomen onzin natuurlijk, gevaarlijke onzin bovendien, en vanwege een historicus onbegrijpelijk. Panta rhei, ook de menselijke geschiedenis. Het is minstens even rechtmatig te proberen tegen de stroom in te gaan als om pogingen te ondernemen de stroom te verleggen of uit te maken, en aannemen dat de stroom opgehouden is, is er om vragen vroeg of laat door de stroom meegesleurd te worden. Dán gaan roepen dat dat de fout is van mensen die niét zo goedgelovig zijn, kan in deze tijden dan wel op sympathie rekenen, maar het zal niet helpen.
  
  Los echter van de moralistische teneur van het laatste hoofdstuk: zeker een aanrader, dit boek !
• 
  Ted Richards

  I once had a professor who would have really loved this book. Given my record from his class, he probably read it before it was even published and dismissed it as 'vague'.
  
  For fans of Armando Iannucci's The Death of Stalin, skip to Chapter 17. For fans of Hulu's The Great, go to Chapter 4. And for anyone interested in the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, probably check out the entire book really. But Chapter's 7 and 20 are pretty good too. As much as this purports to be a history of Russia, the point of this book is to show how 'Russia' in the historical context was first an empire, then a nation, then a union and is now, well, a little bit complicated. Serhii Plokhy takes an ethnographic approach to his history here, which I did not quite get to begin with. The first few chapters really fly by but there's a portion of the book, Part III, Chapters 7-10, which left me feeling very lost. This is ironic, because looking back they might be the most important for demonstrating the important distinctions which were drawn in the early modern period between Kyivan Rus, Muscovite Russia and its wider territorial conflicts.
  
  On the whole, Plokhy's approach is rather academic and leaves little room for historical personality or regional characteristics to come to the forefront. Catherine II and Joseph Stalin come away as the two most memorable individuals by sheer force of their own personalities, but this is not the book for reviving lost characters from history. The main characters here are states; Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. Plokhy tells the story of how these nations and people developed out of and against one another. In doing so, the reader may come away from it with no greater idea of some countries than simply being 'not-Russia', because a lot of the regional narratives are swept up, for the sake of brevity and analysis.
  
  That said, Plokhy does a fantastic job of recontextualizing traditional understandings of the development of Russia itself. Right from the start, in 1470 with the leadership of Ivan the Terrible, Plokhy frames the meta-narrative in terms of Great Russia, Little Russians and White Russians. In modern terms, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. He is particularly brilliant in demonstrating the debt the intellectual and physical Russian Nation owes to Ukrainians. Kyiv is, for much of this history, the heart and mind of the Russian Empire. Indeed, what it meant to be 'Russian' or 'Ukrainian' is a key part of the conflicts which emerge in the latter half of the book.
  
  My favourite chapters were when Plokhy turns this analysis on the Soviet Union. He does a superb job of interrogating the first letter of the USSR, and examining what the union actually meant in political terms. From its original declaration on December 30th 1922, the USSR was founded with the principle of all its republics being politically equal to one another. Russia was the first among equals, and Joseph Stalin quickly made use of this distinction. Plokhy tracks, with outstanding clarity, the withering of this idea. From the cynical manipulation of regional nationalism in World War 2, to the open embrace of Russian chauvinist culture from 1948 onwards, and up to its end with Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt to remedy the deep imbalances in the Union's treatment of its republics. It's a take on the USSR I have not come across before and was interesting, refreshing and well argued.
  
  It has its ups and downs. For anyone interested certain chapters are certainly more engaging than others, and the history is a far wider narrative than I've read in a while. But this stuff matters, and I think it helps to know why the things which are happening now happen.
• 
  Tsai Wei-chieh

  本文已發表在《故事》網站，參見���
  https://gushi.tw/lost-kingdom-review/
  
  俄羅斯與東歐研究在臺灣出版界不算是特別熱門的領域。不過拜去年俄國革命一百周年紀念所賜，臺灣文化界也舉辦了一些相關活動。例如誠品書店就推出了俄國革命的主題書展。不過似乎在臺灣出版界尚未見到關於俄羅斯民族主義的專著。本書《再造失去的王國》的出版正好能填補這個領域的空白。本書作者浦洛基（Serhii Plokhy）為烏克蘭人，自幼在烏克蘭接受教育。曾於1996年前往加拿大亞伯達大學的烏克蘭研究中心研究，2007年轉入哈佛大學歷史學系任教，2013年起任哈佛大學烏克蘭研究中心的主任至今，主要研究東斯拉夫人身分認同與俄羅斯民族主義。作者受到2014年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，佔領克里米亞的事件所觸動，因而撰寫本書探討俄羅斯民族主義的起源、發展與其當代意義，並且強調在這段歷史中基輔羅斯與烏克蘭的重要性。本書的書名「失去的王國」指的也正是中世紀的基輔羅斯。
  
  本書將俄羅斯民族主義的起源追溯自莫斯科大公國（即今日俄羅斯的前身）。莫斯科大公國在伊凡三世（1462至1505年在位）的領導下，於十五世紀下半葉掙脫了蒙古人統治的「韃靼桎梏」，成為一個獨立國家。在後來的日子裡，莫斯科大公國以九世紀建國的基輔羅斯繼承者自居，誓言要收復基輔羅斯的舊地，這包括了今日俄羅斯、烏克蘭與白羅斯等地。當時的史家為此編寫了史書來證明基輔羅斯的統治者在血統上能上溯至拜占庭帝國與羅馬帝國的帝王，因此莫斯科大公國能被視為與羅馬帝國一脈相承的關鍵就在於基輔羅斯。而論證其統治合法性的「王朝世系」與「祖產」概念後來也成為俄羅斯國家與身分認同的重要組成部分。
  
  除了前述的王朝世系與祖產概念以外，在十七世紀初的混亂時期中，東正教成為動員莫斯科大公國人民驅逐外敵波蘭人的強大力量，因此在1613年混亂時期結束，羅曼諾夫王朝建立之後，沙皇、東正教與祖國三個概念成為俄羅斯國家的基礎。而1654年烏克蘭向沙皇宣誓效忠後，更使羅斯的重新統一邁出了一大步。
  
  到了十八世紀俄羅斯帝國的統治者與知識份子將前述的「王朝世系」、「東正教」與新興的民族意識相結合，建構出一個帝俄民族。但是這種民族建構也受到了挑戰，因為在三度瓜分波蘭的過程中，俄羅斯獲得了基輔羅斯的舊地，也將數百萬東斯拉夫人納入俄羅斯帝國，但是這些人多數並非東正教徒，而是聯合教會信徒，而且並不認同自己是俄羅斯人，而更多自認為是小俄羅斯與白俄羅斯人。但由於帝國不接受這種多元性，因此在這個地區強制推行宗教改信政策，以應對波蘭人的威脅。
  
  到了十九世紀下半葉，為了抑制不斷上升的烏克蘭民族主義，俄羅斯帝國不得不調整其民族認同模式，提倡三位一體的俄羅斯民族概念，即俄羅斯人是由大俄羅斯人（即今俄羅斯人）、小俄羅斯人（即烏克蘭人）與白俄羅斯人（即白羅斯人）三個分支所組成的。在此時期，俄羅斯政府也成功抑制了非大俄羅斯文學與高級文化的發展。
  
  然而這種三位一體的俄羅斯民族概念在1905與1917年的俄國革命後無以為繼。在新成立的蘇聯中，俄羅斯人、烏克蘭人與白羅斯人被識別為不同的民族，而且在各個共和國當中推行本土化政策。但是隨著1920年代末期蘇聯對外關係逐漸緊張，擔心非俄羅斯民族主義被外國勢力用來分裂蘇聯，導致本土化政策戛然而止。蘇聯領導人也盡了一切努力讓這三個蘇聯的核心民族保持統一，例如推動無民族色彩的「蘇維埃人」概念，認為蘇維埃人是一個由各族人民構成的大家庭，而在當中俄羅斯人則扮演團結和領導各族人民的角色，帶領蘇聯其他民族走向共產主義。在二次大戰時期，史達林甚至重新強調俄羅斯的帝國遺產以團結內部，並且淡化共產主義意識形態以便取得英美盟國的支持。但是在戰後，非俄羅斯民族的地位又急遽下降。史達林死後，赫魯雪夫與布里茲涅夫等蘇聯領導者又重新擁抱「蘇維埃人」的概念。但是最終他們的努力在蘇聯於1991年解體後，被證明是功敗垂成。
  
  在後蘇聯時期的俄羅斯聯邦則仍在試圖摸索新俄羅斯認同的內涵。2000年普丁上臺後，認為俄羅斯有權主宰後蘇聯空間，但是他起初仰賴的是政治與經濟手段，而非族群、語言和文化概念。後來他經過重新思考，而提出所謂的「俄羅斯世界」概念，認為俄羅斯的歷史與文化是俄羅斯在後蘇聯空間發揮重要影響力的保證。而帝俄時期的歷史與文化遺產，則成為他合理化2014年俄羅斯入侵克里米亞的理據。作者在結論中主張俄烏衝突加速了本來由俄羅斯所主宰之歷史文化空間的解體。而俄羅斯問題的解決方案則取決俄羅斯菁英是否能夠接受後蘇聯時期的政治現實，調整俄羅斯人的身分認同。
  
  如果我們把視野從俄羅斯放大到整個歐洲來看，在十九世紀歐洲的民族主義發展史上，以官方民族主義（official nationalism）最為流行。當時歐洲各個帝國都希望將自己的多元帝國打造成一個統一民族，而沙俄的俄羅斯化政策（Russification）則是其中的代表之一。在本書中提到十九世紀末期沙皇亞歷山大三世（1881-1894）持續打壓烏克蘭語言與文化一事。美國東南亞研究與民族主義理論家安德森（Benedict Anderson）引用休‧賽頓―華生（Hugh Seton-Watson）的研究，提醒我們應該注意同時期在俄羅斯民族主義的發展上，也是「俄羅斯化」成為帝國政策的時代。而且這個政策針對的是對沙皇最忠誠的民族：即波羅地海德意志人。原先波羅地海地區的省份都使用德語教學，後來在1887年左右，所有的公私立學校被要求使用俄羅斯語教學。而1893年該地區著名的多爾帕特大學（University of Dorpat）因為在課堂上使用德語而被迫關閉。而1905年的俄羅斯革命除了是工農階級與知識分子對抗沙皇專制，其實也應該視為非俄羅斯人對俄羅斯化政策的反抗。[1]這可以視為是對本書述及當時俄羅斯民族主義發展的一個補充。
  
  簡而言之，本書透過回顧俄羅斯民族主義的發展，試圖解釋當代的俄羅斯認同如何演變至此，而且理解烏克蘭在俄羅斯認同中所佔的重要位置。對於民族主義、俄羅斯歷史與當代俄羅斯與東歐研究有興趣的讀者，相信都能在閱讀本書的過程中有所收穫。
  
  
  
  [1] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Rev. ver., London and New York: Verso, 1991), 87-88.
• 
  David Jinkins

  Who is the target audience for Serhii Plokhy's new history of Russian nationalism Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation? For a Russian history novice like me, reading the book was like watching film credits. Plokhy has the habit of unnecessarily naming all the bit players in his narrative, who mostly only show up for a page or two. Looking for examples, I randomly opened the book and saw the name Raman Skirmunt, who the Germans put in charge of the Belarusian Rada during World War I. I have used the name Skirmunt in this review more times than it was used in the book.
  
  The book is organized as a chronological narrative, devoting chapters of uniform length (on my ereader, each was around 20 pages) to Russian historical periods. Since there is a lot of history to get through from 1470 to now, the coverage is necessarily breezy. I doubt a specialist would learn anything from such a superficial overview. The theme of nationalism is woven into the story, often -- understandably given the author's origins -- through the relationship between the Ukraine (little Russia) and Moscow/St. Petersburg (big Russia).
  
  One of the great disappointments of the book is how confusing it is about ethnicity, nationalism, and language. Some of the most interesting chapters in the book come towards the end, where Plokhy writes about the fall of the Soviet Union. Some post-Soviet leaders envisioned a civic nation comprising of everyone living within the borders of the new Russia. Others saw Crimea and Transnistria as natural components of the Russian nation because the residents were Russian speaking. But in this milieu of shifting definitions and fluid ideas about who is in and who is out, Plokhy is happy to write that early intellectuals in the Russian Orthodox church were mainly Ukrainian. But what would Ukrainian mean before the 19th century? It was jarring to come across characters described as ethnically Polish or Belarusian or Ukrainian. What exactly does that mean?
  
  I wish the book was organized around themes. A chapter could have been about historical myth and historical reality (Kievan Rus and Russian ethnic identity), another about the right to rule vs self-determination (princes had claims on areas due to historical precedent, not based on who lived there), another about the role of language in Slavic national movements, another about religion, and so forth. This way Plokhy could have avoided the chore of narrating the events in each period, rather focusing more on the interesting things he has to say about the roots of Russian nationalism.