At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War by Michael R. Beschloss

At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War Reviews

• 
  E

  Magnificent despite its age. I left with newfound respect for the elder George Bush. The conduct of foreign policy is delicate, to say the least, and far more art than science. In retrospect, the Cold War's actual end, which was a whimper as opposed to a bang, seems astonishingly improbable. And yet, it concluded almost completely without bloodshed. Beschloss and Talbott's narrative of this unlikely outcome is both highly readable and deeply fascinating.
• 
  Troy Jensen

  A riveting and powerfully insightful insiders look at the management by George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev of events that ultimately encompass the liberation of Eastern Europe, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the suspension of the Soviet Communist Party, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and ultimately the end of the Cold War. This is a must-read for anyone interested in, well, our nation’s very existence to be frank.
  
  But obviously in particular the seminal event of the second half of the 20th Century - the end of the Cold War. President Ronald Reagan plays a fairly small role here as the events documented take place between 1989-1991. It documents in remarkable detail President George H. W. Bush and his ability to manage with Cristal decisions made correctly time and time again during this time period - and it documents in detail the phenomenal number of actors, events and inherent dangers involved with every decision made...all while ensuring that both Bush and Gorbachev did not lose their own party’s and ultimately popular support at each decision point (and even their very own staff’s support!) is a remarkably historical achievement. Especially in the cooperative management with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in particular in warding off Soviet hardliners who had begun to maneuver against Gorbachev in 1989 from many different angles. Gorbachev would ultimately of course fall victim to a failed coup in August 1991. By December 25, 1991, the no longer General Secretary but rather President Mikhail Gorbachev stepped down, and the Soviet Union as an entity on December 31, 1991.
  
  The most geopolitically gripping moments come in Bush and his Administration working as best they could with Gorbachev and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, to try to appease the most dedicated Communists and Soviets and keep that faction of the Central Committee and the Politburo especially from ousting Gorbachev.
  
  The other phenomenally dramatic portions come as the communist-ruled Eastern European nations, formerly satellite states controlled by the Soviet Union, began to fall one by one. The geopolitical implications and in particular the implications for both Gorbachev’s survival as General Secretary trying to transform the USSR into a Social Democracy via his domestic reform programs, glasnost (“openness” - free speech, freedom of the press), and perestroika (“restructuring” - decentralization of the economy). The United States knew if Soviet hardliners took control of the Soviet Union by ousting Gorbachev and his reformist allies, we would be back to dealing with a communist USSR. Even worse was the likelihood a new Politburo and General Secretary of Communist hardliners may overreact to Gorbachev’s reforms.
  
  The tension between Gorbachev and the hardliners grows with each Eastern European nation’s communist party losing power. Under the “Brezhnev Doctrine” (a vague and broad Soviet Foreign Policy that ultimately was wielded how when and where as needed - in Afghanistan, for example, the Soviets leaned on the Brezhnev Doctrine as justification for Brezhnev’s ordering of the deployment of troops in the invasion of Afghanistan to prop up the faltering communist regime there), in place until Gorbachev’s rise to General Secretary, the Soviet Union had the absolute right and indeed was compelled to intervene militarily if these nation’s governments were threatened. Gorbachev joking referred to his Sinatra Doctrine publicly of allowing these Soviet satellite states to “do it their way” as far a electing a government of their choosing. This was for the foreign press, who still adore Gorbachev....in reality with each Eastern Bloc nation removing their communist governments, internal pressures mounted dramatically on Gorbachev - ESPECIALLY when it came to East Germany.
  
  The June 1989 free elections held by Poland marked the first departure from the policy of the Soviet Union intervening in an Eastern Bloc nation.
  
  The chain reaction - or the much debated and derived “Domino Theory” that liberal American politicians had for many years claimed was a foolish geopolitical theory - happened exactly as Nixon and Kissinger (both proponents of the Domino Theory) had predicted. Within each Eastern Bloc nation thereafter, an emboldened citizenry began staging civil resistance protests. In October 1989 Hungary’s communist regime fell and elections were held.
  
  East Germany was next and this portion of the boom takes up quote of bit of the book - Germany had been ground zero in the Cold War and the events leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in on November 9, 1989 (which most Americans simply equate with the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union...as this book so vividly demonstrates, that event was extraordinarily powerful from a moment-in-history perspective, and clearly was a seminal moment in signaling the beginning of the end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  
  But so much more was to follow, events documented in depth by the authors. The real endgame dangers came when internal Soviet Republics began demonstrations for their independence from the USSR - something American historians conveniently seem to leave out or brush over in their work. The Azerbaijan Soviet Republic and Armenian Soviet Republic were the first two with internal civil demonstrations but it was the Baltic Republics - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - that became flash-points for a moment when President Bush and Gorbachev went through the beginnings of a cooling of their relationship. Contrary to historical revisionism, Gorbachev never intended on the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of which Russia was by far the largest buy just one of 15 Republics of the Soviet Union.
  
  This time period marks the endgame and is riveting. Included is Gorbachev’s grandstanding foreign policy actions - including his attempted interference in the U tied States led UN coalition’s war with Iraq to end their occupation of Kuwait in 1990 - are also revealed in detail and will paint a picture of Gorbachev most Americans have no recollection of whatsoever. Fascinating stuff.
  
  In summary, for an impassioned history buff, especially of that time period the writers were closely embedded with the Administration players and covered, is ultimately why I was enthusiastic as I began to read. Learning in the introduction that the authors decided in early 1989 to write a book about the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the next three years was absolutely phenomenal as far as the coincidences of life. They were working as insiders and got to see and ultimately create the best accounting of the management by George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev of events that ultimately encompasses the liberation of Eastern Europe, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the suspension of the Soviet Communist Party, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and ultimately the end of the Cold War.
  
  
• 
  Erik Graff

  I've gone through periods of intense political involvement punctuated by years of relative withdrawal from current events. The Gorbachev period of 1985-1992 was, during its last couple of years, a period of withdrawal. I knew of the big events through the mass media, but I didn't follow them deeply. Thus the attraction of this book, detailing as it does the break up of the Warsaw Pact and, finally, of the Soviet Union.
  
  While written from the perspective of the Executive Branch of the U.S. government, this is a book as much about Mikhail Gorbachev as it is about George Bush. The details of their relationship, of various arms control negotiations and of the uneasy alliance against Iraq are a bit overwhelming sometimes and, for me, boring when it comes to the minutia of arms technology, but the exposition seems thorough so far as it goes.
• 
  Clem

  This was the fourth book I’ve read by Michael Beschloss. Unlike the first three that I thought were brilliant or borderline brilliant, I wasn’t as enthralled with this one. Whether or not it was because he wrote with a co-author or some other reason, I just didn’t feel this one had enough feeling. Instead, this one was all facts. I felt as though I was reading a host of Washington Post articles over a four-year period of the Bush administration that dealt with Mikhail Gorbachev and the splintering of the Communist party.
  
  There were several other major characters in this account, yet nothing was present that gave us any insight to who they were as actual people. We never learned the backgrounds, feelings, and motivations of such figures as James Baker, Eduard Shevardnadze, Brent Scowcroft, and Alexander Bessmertnykh. I mainly bring this up because this was a big strength with Michael Beschloss’s other books. In those accounts, we felt we had some good insights to the key players. We don’t get this here, and it’s sadly needed.
  
  This book is essentially a summary of all the ins and outs of the Cold War with Russia during the (first) George Bush administration. The narrative begins shortly after Bush is elected in the Fall of 1988, and the conclusion happens around mid-1992 when Bush would eventually lose his re-election bid to Bill Clinton. There’s a lot to say in those four years about this subject. I just wish that the authors could have made it more interesting.
  
  Much of this book consists of the two co-authors simply rambling from Point A to Point B to Point C etc. There are a lot of details, events, deals, innuendos, squabbling, and mistrust that takes place, but it comes across as an assembly line made-to-order account instead of something captivatingly interesting. If you’re someone who isn’t overly excited and interested when you watch the news during the stories about foreign affairs, well, this book certainly won’t help you in that area. If, however, you’re a global news junkie and can remember all of the different names (many Eastern European), places, summits, and nuclear weapon jargon, you may warm up to this thing slightly more than I did.
  
  In should be noted that this book is not exclusively about the details of everything pertaining only to the United States and Russia during this particular time. This is the Cold War we’re talking about, so a huge chunk of foreign affairs is included in this book because most of it, somehow, eventually affects how the two powers react, and need to plan for the future. There’s a lot of East Germany, Lithuania, and even Iraq here. While one may recall that Russia was not a major player in the Gulf War, in a sense they were because they were previously allies with Iraq, and since they’re now trying to “bridge gaps” with the U.S., it sure would make a lot of sense if Russia sided with the U.S. where Saddam Hussein and his lunatics were concerned. Of course, that’s easier said than done in a massive political bubble.
  
  In fact, most of this book centers around that very idea – a massive political bubble. Bush and Gorbachev have to play this political game as master chess players. Neither side wants to lose anything, and each of them have their pulse on what the future will probably bring. So when Gorbachev plays hardball with Lithuania, Bush really can’t do the right thing and defend the Baltic nation by criticizing the Soviet Union, because he’s wisely aware that he can’t afford the ire of Gorbachev during this time. He’s right, of course, but in the world of politics, it doesn’t take long for the Democrats (as well as hard-right Republicans) to lash out and complain that the leader of the free world is acting awfully weak and complacent.
  
  Throughout the narrative, Bush definitely comes across as the one with the obvious upper hand. He’s also portrayed very favorably by the authors. He comes across as cool and calm and always knows how to outwit his enemy to gain the most without humiliating his adversary. Gorbachev, however, comes across as the complete opposite. Of course, in all fairness, no matter how good of a ball player you are, if you’re on a losing team that’s getting worse, nothing you do can salvage your reputation, let alone your country. So Gorbachev puts up a brave front, but never really manages to convince anyone that he can do any good. Almost no one in the U.S.S.R. stands behind him during these tumultuous years. Again, though, when you’ve suffered under a misguided ideology for over 70 years, whoever is currently at the helm will have to take the brunt of the criticism when the ship finally starts to sink.
  
  There are some parts of this book that are better than others. The best chapters are when things actually happen; whether it’s the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or the failed 1991 Russian coup, these events make very interesting reading. Unfortunately, when things aren’t “happening”, and all we read about are meetings, correspondence, summit plans, and press bickering, it can really bog one down and one loses interest rather quickly.
  
  In fact, I was initially somewhat excited since the paperback edition I read featured an additional chapter. Yet this extra chapter was basically a continuation of the day-to-day dreadfully dull accounts of everything that had happened in the year between the original pressing of the book and the revision. The only real difference in this extra chapter is we read the names Clinton and Yeltsin instead of Bush and Gorbachev. This addition was incredibly unnecessary and didn’t add anything at all of substance to the main account.
  
  Overall, this was a fairly good account of the comings and goings of the time and subject, but I would recommend Beschloss’s “other” U.S. vs. U.S.S.R book that focused on Kennedy and Khrushchev much more highly than this one. The accounts here are worth telling, but it’s sadly just too dry in too many places.
• 
  Nolan

  I'm often stunned and surprised by the passage of time. This book's events
  happened very nearly a quarter of a century ago now, and yet the memories of
  events mentioned here are so vivid for me, as I suspect they will be for
  you.
  This book is essentially an account of
  the final years of the Soviet Union. But there's no partisan gloating
  here-no jingoistic flag-waving literary shouts about how cool democracy is
  and how it would always have won. It is a no-nonsense factual account of
  the Bush presidency and the vast sweeping changes that occurred during it in
  Eastern Europe and Russia.
  
  I've always thought of diplomacy as a kind of seamy, dirty business where
  everyone lies, no one will be absolutely truthful, and everyone knows that
  the other guy lies. It seems to me a job like that would just drag me down
  to no end. You could trust no one ultimately, and with a job like that,
  you'd probably stay away from mirrors or any other means of self examination
  internal or otherwise. This book shines a bright and unwavering spotlight
  on the tricky word-parsing nature of diplomacy. As Yeltsin rises to power,
  Bush must determine how much praise to lavish on his friend and sometimes
  sparring partner, Gorbachev. You see the diplomatic mistakes, in
  retrospect, that Bush and Secretary of State James Baker make in dealing
  with the wildly fluctuating fortunes of various Soviet officials.
  
  In the midst of all of this, Bush and Baker had the Gulf War to fight, and
  they desperately needed Gorbachev's tacit support if not his full-blown
  assistance. Gorbachev, on the other hand, desperately needed western loan
  guarantees and help he didn't really want to take but knew he had no choice
  if his form of government was to survive, which, of course, it ultimately
  did not.
  
  You'll read about the August 1991 coup, and perhaps you'll remember the
  iconic images of Yeltsin standing defiantly on a tank. That coup fizzled
  and died shortly after it was born, as you'll recall, and Bush had to work
  the seamy side of diplomacy again-trying to determine how much praise to
  lavish on Yeltsin while preserving the friendship of his now politically
  weakened friend, Gorbachev.
  
  In fact, the authors postulate that Bush's over-dependence on Gorbachev was
  a factor in his loss of the presidency in 1992. Clinton was able to
  capitalize on Bush's natural tendency toward caution by slamming the
  president on taking such timid actions to support the Baltic states in their
  quest for freedom.
  
  This is the story of two men who are now aged and out of the limelight.
  It's the story of a form of government that is no more. It is highly
  readable, even for those among us who generally don't touch history or
  nonfiction stuff. I suspect you, like
  me, will be stunned by what appears to be an amazing amount of access these
  two men had to primary sources. They point out in the introduction to the
  book that some of that stuff has been sealed and will not be available for
  another three decades from now.
• 
  Jill Buckingham

  Maybe the cold war doesn't sound interesting but this book is fascinating. What actually happened between the US and the former Soviet Union that changed the face of the globe geo-politically will surprise you.
• 
  Mike

  I know I should read this one but it seems like medicine rather that fun.
• 
  Douglas Graney

  Excellent book. This is one of those "put you in the room" books. Say what you want about his son, but Bush 41 did a great job regarding the USSR.
• 
  Bobby

  Solid and in depth accounting of the end of the Cold War brought about by Gorbachev's attempt to change but ultimately bring about the break up of the USSR.