In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire By Adrian Goldsworthy

Kalliope

This book does not look at the broader picture. Instead, it looks at individuals – but not just any individuals. They were all military and, according to the author, all exceptional since They Made Rome. We ought not to forget that Rome was foremost a military power.

Goldsworthy has selected fifteen personalities (sixteen really), ranging from the third century BC until the end of the Empire, but those of the Republican times are more numerous. He does not begin earlier because the Romans did not begin to write history until the end of the 3rd BC, and he jumps over long periods (the third and fifth centuries AD are vacuums). Many of the commanders are well known (Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Julius Cesar, Germanicus, Titus, Vespasian and Belisarius), but several, mostly from the Republic, are less notorious (Fabius Maximus, Claudius Marcellus, Quintus Sertorius). Some very famous figures are completely jumped over, or at least they do not get their own chapter, such as Augustus.

The author makes an explicit defence of his concentration on individuals. And he does so by quoting a very individualistic one, Napoleon. Goldsworthy finds a direct causality between the particular actions of specific human beings and the resulting events. He argues that even if some of these events could have taken place anyway – later or in a different form – since they happened the way they did, it was as a result of a series of identifiable decisions from identifiable men.

And yet, a general picture does emerge; there was an overall development of the Roman military forces. These began as ad hoc armies, formed for a particular battle or war--and therefore impermanent, to an army which, once Rome had considerably extended its lands and borders, required a permanent military body formed by professionals. In many ways this is unsurprising. What to me was more remarkable were the economic implications of the earlier system: the temporary armies and their unsustainability. Only men with some wealth (read with some productive land holdings) could join these temporary bodies; hopes for booty and an increase in their already property clearly outweighed the risks. But as these wars became long campaigns and these ‘occasional’ soldiers stayed too long away from their home productive base, they began running into debts eventually losing their lands to, guess whom? Many of the Senators who stayed back in cosy Rome had been acting as moneylenders. This trend got to the point that great extensions of land consolidated under fewer heads, which in its turn resulted in fewer eligible volunteers for the next war, since there were not enough people with enough wealth to form the required armies. Rome got itself into a pernicious circle.

One way out was the professionalization of soldiers -- their conscription was signed for very long periods and in distant postings. They received a steady salary to which they could add the eventual booty and upon retirement received some sort of pension, often structured in acceptable pieces of arable land.

There had been another initiative to break the vicious circle. Tiberius Gracchus, in his reform programme of 133 BC, proposed “to redistribute publicly owned land to increase the number of yeoman farmers who had traditionally formed the heart of the legions.” During Christmas I watched a TV episode, directed by Mary Beard, on this admirable Gracchus. His impulse for reform is presented on the screen version as resulting from his will ‘to serve the people’ – with a somewhat anachronistic “socialistic” concern. Goldsworthy’s version seemed to me more enlightening. Yes, Gracchus was a Tribune, but he was also a soldier and therefore perfectly aware of the serious threat to the maintenance of the legions--when permanent garrisons were beginning to be posted in key provinces such as Transalpine Gaul, Spain and Macedonia.

Apart from wealth, class was another concern in the way these armies were formed. In the earlier times, soldiers had a ‘pedigree’. It was Marius (157-86 BCE) who began enrolling men who had new wealth but had not belonged to the traditional families. Amongst the leaders, social changes began to take place and the commanders were no longer necessarily patricians. With these ascents new classes were formed. The legions, composed now of professional and permanent soldiers, began acquiring also a strong sense of identity, and often saw themselves directly associated to a particular man, and less to the State – the Roman Senate. That would pose other problems.

Another fascinating aspect that emerges from this book, is Goldsworthy’s portrayal of the Roman character, their spirit. This was their deep and indomitable belief in their own strength. Even when facing defeat, they would bounce back convinced that eventually they would attain victory. This was their “virtus”- their ability to endure whatever never losing faith in the final triumph.

Goldsworthy’s gallery of Men, they all showed this particular quality, sometimes leading them directly to their death, but winning always additional stature to their unequalled Rome.

Justo Martiañez

3/5 Estrellas

Tenía ganas de acercarme a este autor, uno de los que están pegando fuerte en Novela Histórica en el ámbito anglosajón.
Lo he hecho con este ensayo sobre las campañas y la forma de hacer la guerra de 15 generales romanos: Quinto Fabio Máximo, Marcelo, Escipión Africanus, Emilio Paulo, Escipión Emiliano, Mario, Sertorio, Pompeyo, César, Germánico, Corbulón, Tito, Trajano, Juliano y Belisario. Evidentemente No están todos los que son, sino aquellos sobre los que nos han llegado fuentes históricas más o menos detalladas acerca de sus campañas militares. Donde está Sila, donde está Agrícola, las campañas de Marco Aurelio, de los Severos, no hace referencia a ningún hecho del siglo III (al menos Aureliano o Claudio II), no profundiza en el periodo de la Tetrarquía, ni en el periodo Constantiniano (salvo Juliano). Vamos que ha ido a lo fácil.
Aquí está mi pequeña decepción, al final el libro es una mera transcripción de las fuentes históricas, con relatos de campañas, tácticas y batallas que no pueden competir con las grandes recreaciones que, de estos mismos hechos, se han realizado en los buenos libros de novela histórica que, además, beben de las mismas fuentes, pero de una forma mucho más entretenida y disfrutable.
Puntos positivos:
-Se esfuerza en intentar explicarnos la evolución del ejército romano y del estilo de mando de los generales a lo largo de los siglos, desde el periodo Republicano hasta le época de Justiniano.
-Me ha gustado el capítulo sobre Corbulón (el único general de los incluidos del que tenía poca información previa).
-El capítulo de Trajano es original, ya que intenta interpretar los relieves de la columna trajana a la vista de los hechos conocidos en las dos campañas Dacias.

Si queréis un pequeño repaso de hechos relevantes históricos y militares de época romana, este es el libro, si queréis divertiros tirad de novela histórica tradicional, de autores contrastados: Posteguillo, Coleen MacCollough, Graves, Haefs, Gallo, Grimal, Yourcenar, etc. Aunque siempre es bueno tener presente lo que dicen las fuentes históricas, para poder valorar adecuadamente el grado de verosimilitud de lo que se nos cuenta en las novelas.
Espero que este autor sea un poco menos rígido y más imaginativo en sus novelas. Que va a ser fiel a los hechos, lo tengo claro. A pesar de este pequeño traspiés, le daré una oportunidad a sus libros.

Myke Cole

An excellent analysis of Roman command style, and of the personalities of some of the more prominent commanders. Along the way, you'll learn a lot about ancient warfare and the politics and culture of Rome from the Republic to the end of the Principate. Goldsworthy has an engaging prose style, an excellent command of the sources and a real passion for the subject. His focus - on the leadership qualities of each commander, is original and refreshing, giving new perspective to a well-trod topic.

Spqr

Goldsworthy successfully draws a picture of how Roman generals actually commanded their armies. This book is in similar style to Goldworthy's first book "The Roman Army at War", which covers how the Roman Army actually fought its battles.

Besides the story of individual generals, this book also traces the development of the Roman style of command as it evolved along with changing Roman society. The story starts with Fabius Maximus and Claudius Marcellus who are elected leaders of citizen soldiers in the Second Punic War and ends with Belisarius, a member of the Imperial household, who is general of an army of unruly mercenary cavalry and questionable infantry. A definite "Roman", style of command emerges which Goldsworthy then follows past the end of the Roman world and into modern times through leaders like Gustavus Adolphus, du Picq and especially Napoleon.

The main Roman leaders covered in the book are:

Fabius Maximus (2nd Punic War)
Claudius Marcellus (2nd Punic War)
Scipio Africanus (2nd Punic War)
Aemilius Paullus (Conquest of Macedonia)
Scipio Aemilianus (Numantia)
Gaius Marius (Jugurthine War / Cimbri & Teutones)
Quintus Sertorius (Roman Civil war in Spain)
Pompey the Great (Conquest of the East)
Julius Caesar (Conquest of Gaul)
There is also a chapter on Pompey vs. Caesar in the Civil War.
Germanicus Caesar (Reprisal war across the Rhine after defeat of Varus)
Domitius Corbulo (Armenian War)
Titus Vespasianus (Siege of Jerusalem)
Emperor Trajan (Dacian Wars)
Emperor Julian (Career on the Rhine and in Parthia)
Belisarius (Persian Wars / Battle of Dara)

Goldsworthy also manages to work in many other prominent Roman generals such as Sulla, Lucullus, Agrippa and Paulinus Seutonius.

If you are interested in military leadership, ancient military history or Roman history in general you should read this book.

Jeremy Perron

Adrian Goldsworthy, one of the world's foremost experts on the ancient Roman Empire, wrote this book about the great generals of that civilization. Although the author himself points out that this book is primarily about generals and statesmen and not a complete picture of what Rome was like, he still successfully fills in the gaps as he jumps from one generation of Romans to the next. In effect the reader goes on a journey though the ancient Roman civilization from the Punic Wars to the era of the 'Byzantine Empire'. Goldsworthy has smooth narrative that flows well from the time of Hannibal to the reign of Emperor Justinian.

The book features those who Goldsworthy considers to be the greatest generals in Roman history. Some of the men he studies are very famous already,--such as, Fabius Maximus, Scipio Africnaus, Pompey Magnus, and Julius Caesar--others are barely known,--Aemilius Paullus and the very tragic Sertorius --and some were emperors--Trajan and Julian. Goldsworthy challenges the traditional view that Roman generals--in light of being politicians--were, by default, amateurs who real command fell to subordinates. He argues instead that they were both politicians and military men equally.

"Yet a closer examination of the evidence suggests that most of these assumptions are at best greatly exaggerated and often simply wrong. Far from taking power away from the general, the Roman tactical system concentrated it in his hands. Junior officers such as centurions played a vitally important role, but they fitted into a hierarchy with the army commander at the top and allowed him to have more control over events than less."p.16

Also explored in this book is the culture of the Roman state and how that culture impacted the senators of the Republic in their careers serving it. One of these cultural traditions was that the Romans, even if things were not going their way, would never turn on Rome in favor of a foreign power. Their bond to their homeland was incredibly strong and this is part of what makes the tragic Sertorius's story of exile so particularly sad.

"However important it was for an individual to win fame an add to his own and his family's reputation, this should always be subordinated to the good of the Republic. The same belief in the superiority of Rome that made senators by the second century BC hold themselves the equals of any king ensured that no disappointed Roman politician sought the aid of a foreign power. Senators wanted success, but that success only counted if it was achieved at Rome. No senator defected to Pyrrhus or Hannibal even when their final victory seemed imminent, nor did Scipio Africanus' bitterness at the ingratitude of the State cause him to take service with a foreign king."p.155-6

When the rule of the aristocratic Senate gives way to the emperors the role of the general changed from one of personal achievement and glory to all honor won by one man: the Emperor himself. Imperial Legets won glory only in the Emperor's name giving emperors, such as Augustus, a good deal of bragging rights.

"Augustus brought internal peace to Rome, an achievement which was conspicuously celebrated throughout his principate. His regime relied heavily on the glory derived from continuous and spectacular warfare against foreign opponents. Under its first emperor Rome continued to expand as intensively as it had done in the last decades of the Republic and by AD 14 had brought under its control almost all the territory which would compose the Empire for over four centuries. The Res Gestae, a long inscription set up outside Augustus' mausoleum recounting his achievements, lists a vast array of peoples and kings defeated by the emperor. In style the test is identical to the monuments set up by triumphing generals for many generations, but in sheer numbers of vanquished enemies it dwarfs the victories even of Pomepy and Caesar."p.270

Imperial selfishness on the part of the Emperor seemed like a smart move, especially after it was proven that generals who did earn personnel glory were able to depose an unpopular emperor. However with incidents of emperors being dethoned by popular generals, Goldsworthy points out that this transfer of power to the barracks led to break down in military discipline that sapped the army's strength and with the army went the empire.

I highly recommend this book to anyone. It is an incredible achievement on the part of Goldsworthy and an overly entertaining read. It will greatly increase ones knowledge into the Roman military, its politics, and its leaders though out history.

Jose Marquez

Un libro académico sobre los lideres que desde el marco
político militar forjaron la República y el Imperio Romano muy agradable de leer.
Está organizado en orden cronológico pero la verdad se puede leer en cualquier orden pues cada capítulo trata de un personaje diferente. Yo lo leí en el orden del libro dado que me inicié en la novela historia de la antigua Roma con Escipion Africano con Posteguillo y luego con obras sobre Cesar, Pompeyo y la magnífica saga de Roma de Collen McCullogh que recorre la época de Cesar y sus contemporáneos. Confieso que se poco del periodo de decadencia del Imperio y aunque sabía de Juliano no conocía acerca de Belisario.
Jones una obra árida de leer, de hecho deje de leer novelas por terminar esta obra.

Rindis

Adrian Goldworthy's In the Name of Rome is something of a mixed bag. It purports itself as being an examination of the Roman style of command by looking at several of its most prominent generals. The selection is constrained to those where there's enough known to be able to say something intelligent, which warps the coverage somewhat. Goldsworthy covers fifteen generals, with Caesar coming in for extra attention (of course!) and two (Fabius and Marcellus) combined into one chapter, and thus feeling a bit more summarized.

Despite the fact that this is centered around individual people, Goldsworthy actually spends a fair amount of time providing extra background and bridging, and the volume can serve as a decent history of Rome from the Second Punic War through the early Empire. After his chapter on Titus and the siege of Jerusalem, the gaps become too big (mostly because of a lack of sources on individual commanders) and the overall narrative of events breaks down for the final two chapters on Julian and Belisarius, making them feel more like the separate essays you would expect from the general format of the book.

The part that surprised me, is that while the book is supposed to be about Roman command, it seemed like it had more to say about the Roman military itself. He points out early on that the Roman Republic army was set up to be a very non-professional force, with it's constant cycle of recruiting a legion, training it, and then disbanding it once the immediate goal/campaign is done. This leads to Roman armies having trouble at the start of the Second Punic War when there's been little training, and doing better as experience is gained. In the years afterward, there's a good number of veterans that cycle into the new legions, and help power Rome's growth in the 2nd Century BC. Then the Marian reforms put the legions on a more permanent basis, with long-term training, making it a professional service, and creating the armies that both conquer large portions of the future Empire, and tear the Republic apart as they fight each other.

On the other hand, the last two chapters show just how completely this had all come apart. While the Empire was still a major state, even after the fall of the Western half by the time of Belisarius, and the total number of men under arms could still be fairly large, the actual armies in use were very small in comparison to previous centuries. Goldworthy's main analysis of Julian is that his successful campaigns against various Germanic tribes would have been handled locally by a provincial governor instead of needing attention from near the very top. His failure against Persia is given as being at least partly due to having to manage a larger army and distances than he had yet had to deal with. Finally, Belisarius' armies are generally puny, and he has to put up with a lack of discipline and mutiny that would never have been allowed in an early legion.

The stated idea of how Roman generals functioned is discussed throughout the book as well, but it felt less prominent than the arc I just summarized. But the book is large enough to support both threads, while talking about the actual people involved, and threading much of the history together. At the large scale, all the history in here can be found in any number of other places, but this particular presentation is a good one, and does develop its own themes well.

Liviu

Well written account of the rise and fall of Rome through brief careers of its most famous generals; and a page-turner despite being non-fiction and quite condensed

Pedro Ceneme

This is a great book for any enthusiast of Roman history. As the title suggests, it focuses on the military leaders and the institutions that led to the conquest of the entire Mediterranean by the Romans. Each chapter beings with a summary of the political and institutional background that each man operated: how the army was organized, how politics influenced the decisions of each leader, how the history of the city had developed up to that point. Then it goes on with mini biographies of each leader, with greater focus on their military exploits, providing small insights that likely shaped the decisions and influenced events, such as religious customs, desire to gain prominence through propaganda, material gains, etc.

Goldsworthy relies on a rich mixture of sources, usually basing the narrative on ancient works and inserting different interpretations of some facts by modern scholars. While we can never be entirely sure as to where the truth ends and conjecture begins, it’s fascinating to consider how “history” may be interpreted through different points of view, especially since most of the original sources were, in one form of another, directly affected by the actions of such man. It is also very interesting to see how he positions the Roman army in comparison with contemporary and subsequent armed forces regarding its strengths and weaknesses as well as dispelling some myths that the Romans propagated about themselves.

Some reviewers had issue with the leaders chosen by Goldsworthy. While it is fair to say that he played safe by selecting very famous individuals, the comparatively limited sources we have for other historical figures makes the task more difficult. Nonetheless, I must admit that the chapters I’ve found most interesting dealt with the periods of relatively less information, such as the beginning of the Republic (Fabius Maximus, Marcus Marcellus) and the IV – V century generals (Julian and Belisarius).

Dimitri

well-written as is Goldsworthy's forte, but his selection is 90% predictable who's who of Roman generals, with a heavy slice of the 2nd century BC-AD.

He makes his most interesting point in the intro. Despite the apparent amateurism of the Roman high command, with no academies & little formal on the job training except as a tribune, there was an unofficial streak of imparted wisdom through lost manuals, senior advisors with campaigns under their belt & let's not forget the senior centurions of a Legion with up to thirty years' experience in various theaters of war. Also, the education of Roman nobility, where politics & military glory were inseparately entwined, gave a decent foundation for a young general to command on horseback with sangfroid.

As in any profession since the damn of man, the most important quality was to listen, to learn from mistakes & to delegate. Even if Caesar knew how to time a personal encouragement by appearing at a threatened section of the frontline. The luxury of pre-gunpowder warfare.

Olethros

-¿Están todos los que son? ¿Son todos los que están?.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. Repaso de las acciones de algunos (quince en concreto, aunque se hable de otros en algún momento) de los líderes romanos más exitosos, centrado en qué hicieron, cómo lo hicieron, por qué y para qué, con leves pinceladas de sus biografías y caracteres.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

Scipio Africanus

Not goldsworthys best but def a good book for someone new to the subject. While not his best, it is an absolutely solid book and solidly written.

Campbell

I confess I skipped the latter chapters concerning the Empire as my chief interest in this field lies within the days of the Republic.

John Nellis

This is a military history of Rome from the 2nd Punic wars to the Byzantine empire. It is told through the story of many key generals. It covers many Generals you may know of like Caeser and some not as well known like Titus. This book tells the story of Rome and how these generals shaped its history. Many campaigns and wars were discussed, and I found it a very informative book. It even goes into detail of the history of the Roman military itself and the changes it went through as it developed into one of the greatest armies in the world. Adrian Goldsworthy does a good job telling this history and keeping it interesting.

Fraser

A fantastic read. Well informed, and interesting throughout, this examination of the Roman military machine as seen through the lives of its most famous generals is well worthy of further examination.

Highly recommended.

Ray

Fantastic book - pen portraits of fifteen of Romes finest

Justin Daniel

Well my Roman history obsession continues. After starting the year reading SPRQ and Dynasty, I moved to acclaimed historian Adrian Goldworthy’s account of a unique part of Roman history: namely the generals that won victories for the Republic and then the Empire. In this book, Goldworthy traces the accounts of over 15 different Roman generals and how they won battles in the fight for the good of the Republic/Empire.

Among the most noteworthy is someone I think everyone should at least know the name of: Scipio Africanus. The Punic Wars were a series of wars that the Roman Republic fought against the annoying Carthaginians. After intervening in an uprising during the First Punic War, Carthage came back in full force to threaten the Republic with the brilliant commander Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Scipio was able to repulse the Carthaginians and defeat Hannibal. Livy recounts a story, almost certainly apocryphal, where Scipio asked Hannibal who the greatest general was, Hannibal reportedly said Alexander the Great as the first and Pyrrhus the second. And had he beaten Scipio, he would have put himself before either of them. A nice story, yet Hannibal lost to probably the greatest general in Roman history who never lost a battle: Scipio Africanus.

The second most famous, at least in of the generals in this book, Roman general of note is Pompey (sometimes Pompey the Great). Pompey rose to fame in early battles such as the quelling of the slave revolt of Spartacus and solidifying the agricultural trade in Africa. Later, he rose to power to become of one the triumvirate, consisting of Julius Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey. The power struggle that ensued started a civil war after Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon river. In those days, territories were controlled by what we would call governors. The governors had the right to command troops, and entering into another governor’s land meant you forfeited command. But Julius needed to go to Rome to ascend to the throne and oust Pompey, and so he broke with convention and crossed (after much debate). Pompey and other leaders fled Rome and Julius ascended the throne. Nonetheless, Pompey is still considered one of Rome’s greatest generals.

Julius Caesar had moxie, as the aforementioned Rubicon venture states. When civil war broke out, Julius was able to politically and militarily defeat his enemies thereby leaving the throne at his disposal. Of note in Julius Caesar’s army was Legio X, his most favorite legion and arguable the greatest Roman Legion in history.

I thought a particularly interesting account was that of the general Titus. Titus was the general in charge of quelling the rebellion in Jerusalem. Taking notes from both Roman sources and Hebrew (Josephus in this case) presents a more balanced approach to Roman domination. Titus laid siege to Jerusalem and despite advances from the Hebrews, they were not able to repulse their Roman conquerors and Jerusalem was sacked. This was probably the most interesting account in my opinion.

There is much more as the book looks at many more, but these left impressions on me that I found particularly compelling. What Goldworthy does is interesting in that he views some of the cultural conditions of the time before going into biographical detail on a particular general. Obviously a general in the Republic looked very different from those in the Empire. For one, generals in the Republic were often times statesmen who commanded various legions at their disposal. It would be the equivalent of our statesmen’s, congressman and governors, controlling the local National Guard units (can you imagine?). Further the composition of the army continually changed with technological advances and more advanced doctrine as time progressed.

I felt like the closing comments were particularly poignant. Goldworthy speaks about how the ancient Romans often times fought against rivals who were vastly technologically and organizationally inferior to themselves, much like the unconventional wars we fight today. Further, the influence of Roman armies continue to leave a legacy on armed forces around the world today. The drilling of troops is something Marines learn at boot camp and at times exercise throughout their careers. Often times this is seen as something that is totally unnecessary. Yet, it harkens back to a time where the precision of movements and lack of communication necessitated controlling thousands of troops in an organized way. This carried on into the introduction of the musket. The Romans drilled in 3 lines much like we utilize today. For musketeers however, it was necessary to 1) concentrate firepower, and 2) provide a quicker means of sending bullets downrange. The first rank would fire and begin to reload while the second took their shot, etc. We keep the tradition alive today by drilling and utilizing troop movements from the legacy we received it from. And there are good reasons to do so that I won’t get into right now.

The Marines I know, in particular, have a reading list that is supplied by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If I could put this on the list, it would be one of the books I’d recommend at the General Officer level. There are incredibly important lessons to be learned that are far, far above my pay grade. So if you know any Generals, give them a copy of this book.

Jonathan

just a thoughtful overview of generalship through Roman history with just enough social background for context. The more abbreviated 3rd-4th century AD coverage was very interesting.

David Elkin

I enjoyed the book. A nice overview of some famous and some not so famous Roman generals. Great background work as well. I do think you need to have an interest in Roman History to pick it up. Goldsworthy is an excellent popular historian. In this day and age, perhaps we need to be considering the rise and fall of Empires, including our own, the USA.

John

Scipio Africanus’s stupendously self-confident—and as it would turn out, accurate—statement that his mother had born a general and not a warrior speaks to more than just Scipio’s pride. It speaks volumes about the political, cultural, and martial status of a commander in ancient Rome. It presents a schism between the physical fighting and the leading of an army. This makes sense when one considers the problems of mobility in essentially any period until the modern age. One man could not be at every place at once, especially in a military system that was built around the foot soldier. To command was not to thrust oneself into battle as Alexander did at the head of his household calvary. To command was to remain separated from the front lines and required spatial and temporal awareness. Indeed, commanders were often chided by their own men if they put themselves in danger. The value of their experience was not in their strength of arms, but in their understanding of topography, timing, and the inherent tug-and-pull of battle. Ability, not numbers, was what forged the Roman world at the point of a sword.

Allow me to take a step back. This book is not fifteen biographies pasted together. Nor is it adulatory of Roman martial virtue. It is not even a defense of the Great Man theory of history. The subtitle is more than a little misleading. ‘In the Name of Rome’ presents the military history of the Roman Republic and Empire through the careers of fifteen commanders. It does this with somewhat uneven efficiency, but excels at making a point. This point is that Rome at every point in her history was an extremely martial state, and one sees the very cultural and societal history of Rome presented in her military history. At times of expansion, stasis, and contraction Rome’s civil governance revolved around military force. This was for both self-serving reasons and for national security. As Rome grew and then boomed, she came into contact with innumerable enemies at every point of the compass. She withstood invasions from states small and large. The Republic’s greatest external enemy, Carthage, fielded both disciplined and expertly controlled armies. The clans and tribes of first Italy, then all of southern and Western Europe, the Near East, and North Africa made up in personal skill and courage what they lacked in expertise. These enemies required different leaders and different armies.

Even more so than external threats, internal dynamics shaped how the Roman army grew into a dominant professional force. For men of senatorial and equestrian rank—essentially the upper and upper-middle classes—the corsus honorum and tres militaire, respectively, made military positions extremely lucrative. Once entered into the Senate, a man took political positions in order to gain military commands, thus providing him with the honor and riches necessary for his next political move. This cycle, and the need to perpetually fuel the machine, is what dashed the Republic onto the rocks of a fatal civil war. Because of this, many supreme commanders were not professionals. They may have possessed an education that gave them theoretical knowledge, and may have held junior and then middle-grade commands, but they were rarely given command of armies after decades of previous service. They relied upon equestrians, who more often did possess many years of climbing a somewhat conventional command ladder, and junior officers from lower classes to provide the professional backbone of their armies. In order to protect political allies and then to deal with declining birth rates, armies moved from militias to professional enlisted organizations made up of first volunteers, then conscripts, then non-Italians. The smaller units within armies and legions changed as well, as they became more autonomous and wieldy on the battlefield. But at no point were armies easy to lead. This is why commanders of true genius—like Scipio, Pompey, Caesar, and Trajan—stand out. To command well required an innate understanding of warfare and of humanity, as a professional education was largely out of the question. At times commanders were more motivational speakers than tacticians, but in a style of warfare that required personal stamina and a willingness to put oneself within a spear’s length of the enemy, a good hectoring was sometimes necessary. Julius Caesar was superb at this.

As emperors replaced consuls and senators, they became more and more afraid of internal threats. Because of this commanders were kept on short leashes with smaller armies. The size of legions shrank from nearly 5000 troops to under 2000. But they remained effective. Though large-scale battles were essentially limited to the old days of the Republic against Hannibal and the Macedonians, against omnipresent powers in Persia and Mesopotamia, and against internal revolts at all stages, the Roman army possessed a keen ability to best enemies great and small. Personal pride and sheer efficiency in logistics and battlefield prowess gave Rome greater than even odds that whichever enemy she faced could be bested. This did not protect her against catastrophic losses like Cannae or Teutoburg Wald. But it did protect her against capitulation following such disasters. A large recruiting base and an innate stubbornness and optimism made Rome an extremely resilient state. But her resilience was born in part through an ever-increasing territory, which effectively kept shifting the front lines further and further away from her political, economic, and agricultural power centers. For this Rome needed armies, and for those armies, leaders.

That last statement obviously raises the classic response: what about the common man, the soldiers, the ones actually putting themselves on the bloody threshold? For this, there is one clear answer: Rome produced millions of such men, and if left to their own devices with whichever commanders luck, fate, or providence provided they would’ve accomplished essentially what Roman armies did accomplish, and in due time Rome would’ve risen and fallen regardless. But that is perhaps 60 or 75 or maybe even 90 percent of the discussion. It is that last 10 percent in which great commanders leave their imprint, in which great commanders actually change the course of history. The legions that Caesar led into Gaul in 58 BC were largely the same men that he led across the Rubicon in 49. They followed Caesar because he inspired them to follow him. He harangued them into ignoring missed payments because they held him in awe. They repeatedly fell into his attempts to guilt them into action because they could not bear to be left behind. This was the essence of military leadership in the Roman era. It was tactical brilliance, which relatively few commanders possess (discipline and cohesion covers up many sins on the battlefield), and psychological awareness that made the good Roman generals great. At most points in Roman history, the military life was a integral part of a larger career. Without a formal military education and clear progression in responsibilities as proficiencies grew, the semi-professional nature of her commanders widens the divide between the good and the mediocre and places the exceptional essentially on different planes of existence. In essence, military leadership in ancient Rome was heavily autodidactic and instinctive. In this we see a theory of the the man on the spot that is not at all incompatible with theories that address cultural, societal, and group dynamics. How Roman armies and commanders conducted themselves may not bear too much on modern military dynamics, but it does reiterate the need to foster greatness, initiative, and occasionally recklessness. Julius Caesar was a gambler, and sometimes who dares, wins.

Jeff Clay

This is my third Goldsworthy book and I am kind of thinking that he can't write a bad or boring history book. His writing style is clear, calm, cool and collected with little emotion. Dry perhaps, but rather like a good Bordeaux. Starting with 'The Shield and Sword of Rome' -- Fabius and Marcellus in the 3rd century BC all the way up to Belisarius of the Byzantine Empire, Goldsworthy details the military careers and to some extent the political life of some 15 Roman generals (a few also went on to be Emperors). At the same time he chronicles how tactics and the army itself changed over the centuries, from Republic to Principate to Late Empire and the Byzantine period. These military trends he details well, but considering such a such time span he can really only sketch each general. More detailed biographies on most of them can be found elsewhere. One minor quibble I have is the desire to see more maps of what Goldsworthy is describing. To be clear, the maps he has included are fine. I just wanted more and found myself looking them up online. Despite that little gripe, this book is highly recommended.

Evelyn Wood

This is a fascinating book taking us from 275 BC to 530 AD and looking at Rome through it’s military. Goldsworthy has an engaging style, concise, informative and never boring. Even early in their history the Romans had a deeply ingrained sense of entitlement a belief that it was their destiny to rule the world. As a society they embraced Greece – art, literature, language and philosophy and people from every colour, race and creed provided they signed up to the Imperial Roman idea.

Goldsworthy highlighted, for me, two vital important aspects of the rise of Rome. It’s military discipline enforced, sometimes, with shocking brutality even by the mores of their time. Secondly that their Generals were amateurs, men who coming from the Patrician class were destined to rule as Senators. A time in the military was part of their duty but there was no training simply gifted amateurs leading a citizen army.

Things slowly changed when the Republic gave way to the Empire. An expanded Empire needed more troops, citizens did not want to give years of their lives and so a professional paid army came into being. The military now needed professional soldiers to run it and Rome’s decline in some respects can be traced to that change and the personal ambition it spawned. Rome had been the ideal – now simply the means to an end and that led to the end of Rome itself. We might wonder if professional politicians are the modern equivalent of Rome’s professional Generals; do we have a lesson to learn from history?

Omar Ali

A good overview of Roman military history, from the 2nd Punic war to Belisarius, focusing on 15 selected leaders. The selection can be somewhat arbitrary ( e.g. why not Sulla? or Agrippa? especially since no naval commander really makes the list) though that may be because of what sources are available and what are lost.
He can be somewhat pedantic and the style sometimes made me think I was reading a book by John Keegan, though of course that is not necessarily a bad thing. But you know what I mean; sometimes he really doesn't have that many details, but he makes it sound like you should also know everything about the furusiya of the Mamlukes..that sort of thing.
This is not a comprehensive history of the Roman army. For example, he has little to say about how much money was spent on the army? how was it handed out and actually handled? how and where were the weapons made? a list of weapons? how were the supplies arranged? how many men died of disease? what was the medical corps, where did it come from, what did it do? that sort of thing). All that would have been really nice, but this is not that book. But it IS about 15 of Rome's major military leaders and also lightly fills in the background of events that were happening around those leaders lives. I have heard his later books are even better, but this is still worth reading if you are a fan of the Romans and of military history in general.

Lauren Albert

I have definitively concluded that "true" military history is just not for me. By that I mean the kind of history that focuses on battle strategy, armaments, etc. I do find interesting the kind of history that focuses on the psychological and the sociological aspects of war. Why did the Romans fight like the Romans did? Why did certain leaders behave in ways that were detrimental to their causes? Goldsworthy does have some of the latter in this book but it had too much of the nitty gritty to be of interest to me. This is definitely for military history buffs and not just people interested in the Roman Empire (like me).

Dhruva Narayan

"The personality of the general is indispensable. He is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gaul’s were not conquered by the Roman Legions but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldier that Rome was made to tremble, but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx that penetrated India but Alexander. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European powers by Prussian soldiers but by Frederick the Great."
-Napoleon Bonaparte

In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire brings to life the stories of an array of characters from Roman history, from the most famous generals like Julius Caesar to some less well-known ones like Corbulo. The author talks about 15 Roman generals, consuls and emperors who rose up when Rome needed them the most to defend itself against external threats or conquer new lands and expand its frontiers.

With each person having just a single chapter's worth of content about their military or political achievements, we don't get too many details about other aspects of their lives. This might make it a little dry for some people, but
Adrian Goldsworthy still does an extremely good job of putting these stories together and providing continuity between the chapters. Since all the historical figures here are discussed in chronological order, you can see the history of Rome unfold in the background of all these characters, from chapter to chapter, from the Punic Wars to the Byzantine empire. This really adds value to the book because you can look at how the circumstances of each of the people described here were different from those of their predecessors.

In total, this book does a really good job talking about some of the most important generals in Roman history and I would recommend this to anybody who is interested in Roman history or military history.

Dennis Murphy

In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire by Adrian Goldsworthy is book consisting of a series of biographic essays organized in a chronological way. Goldsworthy contends that it is in the acts of influential military leaders that the history of Rome came to pass. Unseen material, social, economic, and technological forces may drive history, but so much of our understanding of history is comprised of people making decisions in a conscious and unconscious manner. Certain events were not inevitable, and even if one can make the claim that some events were bound to happen eventually, both the time and the conduct of those events would be different if helmed by a different commander. Goldsworthy is quick to say that Rome would have rose and fell even if all of the commanders he wrote about, and all of their contemporaries, died in their infancy, but even so there is something worthwhile to be learned from the study of these figures.

I'm almost certainly inclined to agree, though I will say that the selection was a bit haphazard. There are quite a few time skips that don't always make the most sense. While Goldsworthy is clear that he only wants to recount commanders where there is substantial tactical and operational knowledge available, I still found it a little weird that a great many commanders were completed skipped over. Titus to Julien to Belisarius were some rather dramatic skips, for instance. The author does try to mend the gaps a bit, but it is rather truncated at times. I enjoyed learning about the gradual transformation of the Roman Army across time, and I wish more time was spent on it. Perhaps additional military commanders to fill out the last 400 years of the period of study would have been of some benefit.

The introduction to the edition I finished recounted how this book served as the skeleton for a lot of Goldsworthy's later books. I have to say, after completing this one, I'll be eager to try another soon.

Cade

This book is an overview of the role of Roman military commanders told in the form of a series of case studies of 15 particular commanders spanning a large swath of the Roman Empire's history. In this way, it covers the interesting topics of Roman military doctrine, tactics, and structure, but it also infuses these concepts with a readability and sense of drama from the case studies. Thus, it is interesting and entertaining.

I have read several books by this author, and so many of his points about the way battles actually occurred and evolved were familiar to me, but they are likely to be even more interesting if you are less familiar with his other work. The figures are well chosen based on a combination of their intrinsic value as illustrations and the relevance of the source material we have to judge them. The scope even continues past the fall of the Western Empire into some campaigns of the Byzantine Empire. As with other Goldsworthy books, I wish there were more illustrations/diagrams and most especially more maps. I think given the uncertainty of the specific locations for ancient events, the author is hesitant to put forward maps of specific locations. However, even some large scale general maps of the areas covered showing obvious landmarks like rivers with putative locations of specific incidents would be a valuable addition.

Title	:	In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire
Author	:	Adrian Goldsworthy
Rating	:
ISBN	:	-
Language	:	English
Format Type	:	Paperback
Number of Pages	:	480
Publication	:	First published May 1, 2003

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